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We show that the acquiring firm’s idiosyncratic stock return volatility (sigma) is an important 
determinant of the selection and perceived valuation effects of earnouts in Mergers and Acquisitions 
(M&As). Earnout-based M&As are more often announced by high-sigma acquirers (nearly 40% of all 
earnout-based M&As), yet the documented higher risk-adjusted returns accrued to acquirers in 
earnout-based M&As, relative to M&As settled in cash, stock or mixed payments (the earnout effect), 
appear in deals announced by low-sigma acquirers (nearly 20% of all earnout-based M&As). High-
sigma acquirers employing earnouts appear to break even, or even experience losses, relative to their 
counterparts employing single up-front payments. These results are confirmed based on a quasi-
experimental design through which the earnout effect is measured in isolation. We argue that in 
M&As announced by high-sigma acquirers, the earnout effect is potentially elusive due to the 
presence of an acquirer-specific information revelation effect, resulting from the heightened extent 
of information asymmetry between (small) acquirers’ managers and outside investors. On the 
contrary, the use of earnouts in M&As announced by low-sigma (large) acquirers, whereby the 
acquirer-specific information revelation effect is likely marginal, sends a strong signal for value 
creation that also prevents investors from inducing a size-related discount. 
 
Keywords: Acquirer idiosyncratic stock return volatility (sigma); Information asymmetry; Earnouts; 
Risk-adjusted returns; Propensity Score Matching (PSM). 
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The choice of payment method in Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) is often guided by the aim 
of mitigating valuation risk, originating from asymmetric information (i.e. adverse selection) over the 
target firm (Hansen, 1987; Eckbo et al., 1990; Faccio and Masulis, 2005; Eckbo et al., 2018). Such 
adverse selection is particularly prominent in M&As of unlisted (i.e. private and subsidiary) target 
firms and can be further aggravated in case the target fails to perform as originally envisaged, or to 
comply with the terms of the deal during the integration phase (i.e. moral hazard). As a multi-stage 
contingent payment mechanism, earnouts can effectively address the respective concerns arising 
from ex-ante adverse selection and ex-post moral hazard considerations and, thus, offer a solution to 
the implied valuation disagreement of the merging firms (Kohers and Ang, 2000).1 Therefore, given 
the benefits originating from the reduction of merger valuation risk upon the use of earnouts, it is 
not surprising that this payment mechanism has been increasingly employed, reaching 
approximately 14% of all M&As in recent years, from nearly 3% in the mid-1980s.2 In a seminal paper 
on the effect of the use of earnouts on the acquiring firm’s value, Kohers and Ang (2000) show that 
earnout-based deals yield significantly higher acquirer short- and long- run risk-adjusted returns, 
relative to deals settled in single up-front payments of cash or stock (hereafter referred to as the 
earnout effect). 
Confronted with the stylized features and valuation implications of this contingent payment 
mechanism, the purpose of this paper is to further scrutinize the earnout effect, being mainly 
motivated by an established observation in prior studies (which is further detailed in the sample 
statistics section of this paper). That is, the majority of acquirers in earnout-based M&As are 
relatively small firms.3 When compared to large firms, this asset class of acquirers is characterized 
by significantly higher idiosyncratic stock return volatility (i.e. sigma), an aspect that has been mainly 
attributed to the increased extent of asymmetric information between small firms’ managers and 
outside investors (Campbell et al., 2001; Moeller et al., 2004). Along these lines, prior studies have 
established a strong link between acquirers’ sigma and the choice of payment method in M&As, as 
well as acquirers’ short-run risk-adjusted returns (Moeller et al., 2007). Overall, evidence suggests 
that, depending on sigma, acquirers’ risk-adjusted returns during the announcement of M&As may 
                                                 
1 In an earnout-based deal, the target receives only a part of the deal consideration during the announcement of the deal, 
while the receipt of the deferred (remaining) payment(s) is conditional upon the satisfaction of pre-specified performance-
related goals (i.e. the earnout terms) within a pre-determined period(s) (i.e. the earnout period). 
2 Earnout-based M&As mainly involve unlisted target firms operating in intangible-rich sectors, such as the high-tech, 
pharmaceuticals, and other patent-loaded and services-based sectors (Kohers and Ang, 2000; Cain et al., 2011). 
3 Acquirers in earnout-based M&As are less than half the size of acquirers engaged in M&As settled in conventional single 
up-front payments of cash or stock (Barbopoulos et al., 2018a). Along similar lines, Banz (1981) points to the limited 
information available to investors over small publicly listed firms. 
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also reflect the release of new non-M&A-related information over the acquiring firm (hereafter 
referred to as the acquirer-specific information revelation effect), as opposed to being solely 
reflective of the impact of the expected economic benefits of the deal itself (Moeller et al., 2004). 
These empirical findings (i.e. the small size of acquirers in the majority of earnout-based deals 
and the high levels of sigma within this portfolio of M&As) raise important questions over the use of 
earnouts in M&As. In particular, they are suggestive of the potential presence of the acquirer-specific 
information revelation effect, which may limit the prevalence of the earnout effect, or even render it 
elusive. It is therefore in principle a possibility that the perceived earnout effect is distorted, due to 
the increased extent of information asymmetry between the managers of small acquiring firms that 
typically engage in earnout-based M&As and outside investors. We further elaborate on these 
relations through the following arguments. 
First, we seek to establish a relation between acquirers’ sigma and the choice of earnouts in 
M&As. In this respect, we consider that most targets in earnout-based M&As are privately held firms 
(Kohers and Ang, 2000; Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam, 2012). As the market for private firms is 
typically illiquid (Draper and Paudyal, 2006), most targets’ managers are likely to prefer cash as the 
medium of exchange. However, cash is likely to be a ‘sub-optimal’ equilibrium payment method for 
acquirers, particularly if it pays for difficult-to-value targets, which are challenging to integrate into 
their core business (Fishman, 1989). Stock-financing, on the other hand, which is the closest 
contingent payment alternative to implementing earnouts, could offer a direct solution to acquirers.4 
Yet, stock may also not be the preferred financing method for acquirers as (a) under increased sigma, 
it may not serve the appropriate incentive mechanism postulated by Hansen (1987) and put forward 
by Chang (1998)5 and, therefore, may be a ‘sub-optimal’ contracting method in accommodating the 
target’s high valuation risk and (b) stock may dilute the (potentially small) acquiring firm’s 
ownership structure.6 Stock financing may also fail to represent the preferred payment method for 
the target firm’s managers as, among other reasons, (a) under increased sigma, it may raise 
misvaluation concerns over the acquiring firm’s shares and, hence, result in the target firm’s 
                                                 
4 Depending on the earnout composition (e.g. whether both initial and contingent payments are in stock), earnout-based 
M&As can be very similar, or dissimilar, to stock-financing (see Barbopoulos et al., 2018b). 
5 Hansen (1987) has theoretically illustrated that, given that a target firm knows its own (true) value better than a potential 
acquirer, the acquirer will prefer to offer stock, as opposed to cash, due to the implied contingent-pricing properties of 
stock. Therefore, under stock-financing, the target will be incentivized to share valuable information with the acquirer 
during the valuation and negotiation phase of the deal and, hence, eliminate valuation errors ex-ante. Such valuation errors 
can lead to significant valuation corrections ex-post and, thus, significant target losses too. 




management rejecting7 this medium of exchange (Chang, 1998), and (b) the shares of small acquirers 
are typically locked-up or cannot be sold or traded (to provide immediate liquidity to the target firm) 
for a sufficient period following the announcement of the deal.  
The above suggest that the use of earnouts is likely to: (a) ‘bridge the gap’ in the inherent 
disaccord over the deal’s intrinsic value, (b) provide cash immediately (by means of the first-stage 
payment) to the shareholders of the target firm and (c) signal the unwillingness of the merging firms 
to finance valuation-complex deals with stock. Both (a) and (b) are likely to accommodate potential 
valuation concerns and liquidity shortages regarding the target firm, irrespective of the acquiring 
firm’s information environment. Conversely, (c) is highly sensitive to the extent of information 
asymmetry over the acquiring firm. Put simply, earnouts could potentially serve as an acceptable 
payment mechanism for both acquirers and targets that agree to proceed with the deal upon 
disaccords over their valuations and alternative transaction mediums of exchange. In this respect, as 
increased information asymmetry over the acquiring firm could also be linked to, or even trigger, 
such disagreements, it could motivate the use of earnouts. 
Second, we establish a relation between acquirers’ sigma and the wealth effects of earnouts in 
M&As. Accordingly, we consider that acquirers in earnout-based deals are often small firms (Kohers 
and Ang, 2000; Barbopoulos et al., 2018a). As small firms are characterized by increased levels of 
information asymmetry and, as also confirmed empirically, high levels of sigma (Campbell et al. 
2001), their heightened sensitivity to non-systematic factors (i.e. high idiosyncratic risk) renders 
firm-specific information particularly valuable (Campbell et al., 2001). Such information is primarily 
possessed by acquirers’ managers and is eventually reflected in security prices via information-
releasing events, such as M&As (Dierkens, 1991).  
As in the case of other major corporate events (e.g. seasonal offerings, bond issuance), M&A 
announcements attract media attention and place the acquiring firm under the spotlight of investors 
and analysts. In this specific setting, if the capital market’s assessment of the deal is unbiased, the 
acquiring firm’s risk-adjusted returns should reflect the impact of the expected economic benefits of 
the deal, in addition to the release (if any) of new non-M&A-related information over the acquiring 
firm (i.e. the acquirer-specific information revelation effect) (Moeller et al., 2004). Therefore, as 
acquirers’ risk-adjusted returns may fully, or partly, reflect the deal’s economic benefits, it could be 
that the perceived earnout effect is, in fact, distorted (or subsumed) by the acquirer-specific 
                                                 
7 The pecking order theory postulated by Myers and Majluf (1984) suggests that managers would be inclined to use equity 
when they believe it is overvalued. Taking advantage of this overvaluation would allow the acquirer to buy a target at a 




information revelation effect, the magnitude of which (and consequent elusiveness of the earnout 
effect) depends on the extent of asymmetric information over the acquiring firm. As the latter is 
expected to be heightened within the portfolio of earnout-based M&As, given the small size of 
acquirers that typically engage in earnout-based deals, it is worth examining the interaction between 
acquirers’ sigma and acquirers’ risk-adjusted returns during the announcement period. 
Lastly, this paper is also motivated by newly emerged features of earnout-based M&As that point 
to the growing popularity of earnouts even in mega-deals.8 Therefore, the suitability and wealth 
effects of earnouts in large deals involving large acquiring firms that generally exhibit low 
asymmetric information (and, hence, sigma), relative to small acquirers, and for which the 
elusiveness of the earnout effect is expected to be marginal, remains to be thoroughly investigated. 
Our analysis is conducted using 35,121 M&A announcements between 1980 and 2016 
(inclusive) made by US-domiciled acquirers. A standard event-study methodology is adopted to 
measure the effect of each announcement on the acquiring firm's risk-adjusted returns. To 
accommodate self-selection concerns, a quasi-experimental design is used based on which the 
earnout effect is measured in isolation via the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) method. To 
overcome potential issues pertinent to the functional form of the propensity score estimator, the 
Rosenbaum bounds method (Rosenbaum, 2009) is employed. 
Our main findings show that high-sigma (low-sigma) acquirers announce nearly 40% (20%) of 
all earnout-based deals. However, only those earnout-based deals announced by acquirers exhibiting 
low sigma are perceived to enjoy higher short-run risk-adjusted returns, relative to their non-
earnout counterparts. High-sigma acquirers in earnout-based deals appear to break even, or even 
experience significant losses, relative to their non-earnout high-sigma counterparts. The results from 
the PSM analysis confirm these findings by showing that it is earnout-based M&As announced by low-
sigma acquirers (as opposed to earnout-based M&As announced by high-sigma acquirers) that 
appear to significantly outperform their counterfactuals. Moreover, with respect to deals involving 
private targets, the results suggest that it is only earnout-based M&As announced by low-sigma 
acquirers that result in significantly greater risk-adjusted returns, relative to deals involving single 
up-front payments of cash, stock, or mixed. 
Consistent with information asymmetry models (Moeller et al., 2007), we argue that our results 
suggest the prevalence (elusiveness) of the acquirer-specific information revelation effect (earnout 
effect), which, under high acquirer sigma, can be perceived as the main source of acquirers’ aggregate 
                                                 
8 For instance, the 2015 acquisition of Visa Europe Ltd. by Visa Inc amounted to roughly $17 billion in deal value, nearly $4 
billion of which constituted the deferred payment. 
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announcement period wealth effects, irrespective of payment method. Conversely, as the acquirer-
specific information release is expected to be marginal in earnout-based deals announced by low-
sigma acquirers, the higher risk-adjusted returns are more likely to be due to the prevalence of the 
earnout effect. Hence, the deal’s increased synergy potential, embedded in the earnout effect, is 
effectively captured in acquirers’ risk-adjusted returns. 
Confronted with the above, the paper also examines the extent to which size-effect 
considerations influence our findings (Moeller et al., 2004). The results of our analysis suggest that 
the earnout effect appears to prevail in deals announced by large (or low-sigma) acquirers. Thus, the 
use of earnouts, especially in deals announced by low-sigma acquirers, may be perceived as sending 
a strong signal for value creation that also prevents investors from inducing a size-related discount. 
The paper makes credible contributions to the earnout literature. More specifically, it uncovers 
a strong link between acquirers’ sigma and the use of earnouts, as well as a significant interaction 
between acquirers’ sigma and acquirers’ risk-adjusted returns around the announcement of earnout-
based M&As. As sigma represents an established proxy for information asymmetry over a listed firm 
(Dierkens, 1991; Moeller et al., 2007), this paper draws the attention to the characteristics of publicly 
traded acquirers and illustrates the elusiveness of the earnout effect under high acquirer sigma.9 We 
argue that this is due to the considerable presence of an acquirer-specific information revelation 
effect. 
Albeit that identifying the content of the acquirer-specific information that is released in the 
market during the event of the M&A announcement is beyond the research scope of this paper, this 
is the first earnout paper that focuses explicitly on the acquiring firm’s side of the deal by examining 
whether variables suggested by information asymmetry models are helpful in understanding the 
perceived valuation effects of earnouts in M&As, while accounting for selection bias and size effect 
considerations. It also needs to be mentioned that our findings should not be regarded as suggesting 
that there is no synergy potential in earnout-based deals announced by high-sigma acquirers, or that 
earnout contracts are not incentive-compatible in such M&A negotiations. Rather, we argue that the 
perceived positive earnout effect in such deals is likely to be elusive due to the presence of the 
acquirer-specific information revelation effect that is embedded in the portfolio of earnout-based 
M&As that are announced by high-sigma acquirers. More research is therefore needed in terms of 
identifying the information content of the acquirer-specific information revelation effect in shaping 
acquirers’ risk-adjusted returns during the announcement of earnout-based deals.  
                                                 
9 Moeller et al. (2007) illustrate the superiority of sigma as a proxy for information asymmetry, relative to alternative 
information asymmetry proxies (such as the standard deviation of the earnings announcement abnormal returns), or 
relative to diversity of opinion proxies (such as, the dispersion of analyst forecasts and breadth of ownership). 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates and presents the 
testable hypotheses. Section 3 outlines both the methods and main variables that employed to 
conduct the empirical analysis. Section 4 refers to the data and the sample statistics. Section 5 
presents the main results. Section 6 concludes this paper with an overarching discussion of the 
results, along with suggestions for future research. 
 
2. DEFERRED PAYMENT MECHANISMS AND ACQUIRERS’ RISK-ADJUSTED RETURNS 
Information asymmetry between merging firms in M&As may (mis)lead an acquirer to buy a 
‘lemon’ (Akerlof, 1970), but it can also (mis)lead a target to be purchased at a discount. As discussed 
by Officer et al. (2009), this problem is further exacerbated in M&As in which the target firm is 
characterized by high degrees of opacity, which is often the case for unlisted firms. Acquirers, as a 
result, are motivated to employ numerous valuation risk mitigation tools, which are regularly closely 
related to (a) the choice of payment method used to finance the deal (i.e. cash, stock, mixed), and (b) 
the delivery mechanism of the deal’s consideration (i.e. single up-front, deferred). Prior studies (see, 
for example, Hansen (1987), Fishman (1989) and Eckbo et al. (1990)) have investigated the role of 
asymmetric information on the choice of payment method in M&As. By assuming two-sided 
information asymmetry, these studies show that the division of the deal’s surplus between the 
merging parties becomes a function of the size of the bid and of the medium of exchange. Fishman 
(1989) shows that, in the presence of large disagreements over the value of the target, the use of 
single up-front payments of cash may be the outcome of a ‘sub-optimal’ contract design. 
More recently, Kohers and Ang (2000) and Barbopoulos et al. (2018b) for the US, and 
Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam (2012) for the UK, studied the valuation risk mitigation properties of 
earnouts. These studies illustrate the suitability of this contingent payment mechanism in M&As 
involving relatively small acquirers of targets that are characterized by increased valuation 
complexity or opacity. Reuer et al. (2004) further show that the likelihood of earnout choice in a 
deal’s payment process increases with the uncertainty faced by the acquiring firm over the value of 
the target. In addition to their obscure nature that is often defined by their listing status (i.e. private 
or subsidiary), targets in earnout-based M&As often operate in intangible-rich sectors (e.g. the high-
tech or the pharmaceuticals sectors). The expected synergies of these deals are difficult to estimate 
due to the target’s business idiosyncrasy and intangible assets giving rise to information asymmetry, 
as well as due to the sensitivity of their estimation to the flair, creativity and skill of only a few key 
members of personnel. The above give rise to valuation risk and, ultimately, more scope for 
negotiation (and perhaps re-negotiation), as substantial disagreements may emerge. 
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Confronted with the intuitive suitability of earnouts in valuation-complex deals, prior studies 
show that acquirers enjoy, on average, significant gains during the announcement of earnout-based 
M&As, which are also superior to those generated from deals settled in single up-front payments of 
cash or stock. Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam (2012) further show that ‘correctly’ classified earnout 
choice, based on logit models predicting ‘optimal’ earnout choice, leads to even higher announcement 
period and long-run acquirer risk-adjusted returns.10 
Nevertheless, a dimension within the earnout literature that has received limited or no attention 
to this date concerns the possibility that asymmetric information over the acquiring firm (i.e. the 
asymmetric information between acquirers’ managers and outside investors) may distort the 
perceived earnout effect. As acquirers’ managers and market participants are likely to possess 
dissimilar loads of information over the value of the firm (e.g. its growth prospects, investment plans, 
scheduled capital expenditures, key personnel, R&D pipeline, value of intangible assets), with the 
former group being exposed to significantly more information than the latter, information revelation 
events (such as M&As) are expected to shape acquirers’ prices considerably. Arguably, the extent of 
information asymmetry over an acquiring firm is expected to be more severe when acquirers are 
small firms, for which the available information in the market is limited (Banz, 1981); hence, their 
perceived risk is much larger (Draper and Paudyal, 2008). Campbell et al. (2001) also illustrate the 
increased idiosyncratic risk characterizing small firms. Similarly, assuming that the acquiring firms’ 
managers and outside investors are equally informed about non-firm-specific factors, any firm-
specific information is what remains to be factored into acquirers’ share prices. Such an outcome 
would be expected to occur either through the passage of time or through an information-releasing 
event (Dierkens, 1991). Until that equilibrium condition is reached, the market bears some firm-
specific uncertainty.11 
Along these lines, due to their considerable size that often guarantees significant media 
coverage, M&A announcements result in the release of a substantial load of acquirer-specific 
information, which attracts the attention of investors and analysts. The latter may in turn factor in 
this information and adjust their assessments of the acquiring firm’s true value. Therefore, acquirers’ 
short-run risk-adjusted returns should reflect, in addition to the expected economic benefits of the 
                                                 
10 Limited evidence is also provided considering the announcement period wealth effects of earnouts in cross-border M&As. 
Mantecon (2009) examines alternative methods of valuation uncertainty avoidance and indicates that the use of earnouts 
benefits predominantly domestic acquirers, leading to positive announcement period risk-adjusted returns. However, 
Barbopoulos et al. (2018a) show that the use of earnouts benefits acquirers with no, or limited, international business 
experience. 
11 Information asymmetry corresponds to only a subset of the total uncertainty about the firm, as the managers of the firm 
and the market are likely to be equally well-informed about market-wide variables influencing its value (Dierkens, 1991). 
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deal, the release of non-M&A-related information regarding the acquiring firm. In this respect, Draper 
and Paudyal (2008) document that undervalued firms with greater information asymmetry enjoy 
greater risk-adjusted returns as a result of information revelation regarding their value, revelation 
of expected synergies, or both. Within this context, Moeller et al. (2007) test information asymmetry 
models inspired by Myers and Majluf (1984) and put forward by Travlos (1987). The authors 
illustrate the superiority of sigma as a proxy for information asymmetry that significantly interacts 
with the method of payment and the listing status of the target firm in shaping acquirers’ risk-
adjusted returns during the announcement period.12 
The above suggest that the market’s reaction to the announcement of M&As (both earnout- and 
non-earnout- settled) should accommodate, in addition to the expected synergies of the deal, the 
impact of the release of non-M&A-related information over the acquiring firm. Such acquirer-specific 
information release should be greater under increased information asymmetry over the acquiring 
firm (arguably due to its small size, as elaborated in Campbell et al., 2001); which would, in turn, be 
indicated by high acquirer sigma.13 Within the context of earnout-based M&As, considering the small 
size and high levels of sigma that characterize acquirers that typically engage in such deals, the above 
suggest the potential presence of an acquirer-specific information revelation effect, which could 
potentially distort the earnout effect. Such an outcome would cast doubts over the perceived superior 
comparative performance of earnouts over single up-front payments. In fact, acquirers’ risk-adjusted 
returns during the announcement of earnout-based deals could be identical, or even inferior, to those 
from non-earnout-settled deals once controlling for the acquiring firm’s sigma, thereby confirming 
the elusiveness of the earnout effect.14  
By contrast, asymmetric information over low-sigma (large) acquirers is expected to be 
considerably less material. Therefore, the earnout effect in low-sigma acquirers’ short-run risk-
adjusted returns is expected to be unbiased (or materially less biased) due to the absence (or 
considerably reduced presence) of the acquirer-specific information revelation effect. The main 
hypothesis is therefore set as follows:  
                                                 
12 Pastor and Veronesi (2006) illustrate the positive relation between a firm’s sigma and uncertainty about average 
profitability, as well as the idiosyncratic volatility of profitability. Irvine and Pontiff (2009) attribute the recent rise in sigma 
to increased economy-wide competition resulting in firms enjoying lower market power. Jiang et al. (2008) illustrate that 
high-sigma firms tend to have poor information disclosure, leading to more heterogeneous beliefs among investors. 
13 High asymmetric information between high-sigma acquirers’ managers and outside investors is also likely to imply 
relative mispricing or perhaps undervaluation (Draper and Paudyal, 2008; Moeller et al., 2007), whereas the selection of 
earnouts by high-sigma acquirers may also serve the unwillingness of acquirers’ managers to mitigate the inherent 
valuation risk with relatively undervalued shares. 
14 It needs to be mentioned, nevertheless, that such an outcome would not suggest that there is no synergy potential in 
earnout-based deals involving high-sigma (or small) acquirers. Rather, such an outcome would suggest that it would be a 
fallacy to infer an earnout-based deal’s synergy potential from acquirers’ short-run risk-adjusted returns without 
controlling for the influence of the release of acquirer-specific information. 
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a) Low-sigma acquirers enjoy significantly greater short-run risk-adjusted returns in earnout-
based deals, relative to deals settled in non-earnout payments. 
b) High-sigma acquirers do not enjoy significantly greater short-run risk-adjusted returns in 
earnout-based deals, relative to deals settled in non-earnout payments. 
 
3. METHODS 
The methods employed to estimate acquirers’ risk-adjusted returns are presented first. 
Subsequently, the tests used to address self-selection bias concerns with regards to the endogeneity 
inherent in employing earnouts (or not) are presented. Finally, the multivariate tests and the 
variables employed in them are presented. 
 
3.1. Estimation of acquirers’ risk-adjusted returns 
The estimation of acquirers’ risk-adjusted returns is conducted as follows: 
  𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝐸𝐸�𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� (1) 
Where: 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡, is the abnormal return to acquirer 𝑖𝑖 at day 𝑡𝑡, 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the realized stock return of acquirer 𝑖𝑖 
at day 𝑡𝑡, and 𝐸𝐸�𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� is the expected return of the acquiring firm 𝑖𝑖 at day 𝑡𝑡, estimated based on the 
Fama and French (1996) three-factor model (3FF) as in Equation (2) below: 
 𝐸𝐸�𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� = �1 − ?̂?𝛽𝑖𝑖�𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡 + ?̂?𝛽𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸�𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡� + ?̂?𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝐸𝐸(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡) + ?̂?𝛽𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸(𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡) (2) 
The parameters ?̂?𝛽𝑖𝑖, ?̂?𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠, and ?̂?𝛽𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 are estimated over days 𝑡𝑡 − 250 to 𝑡𝑡 − 40, where 𝑡𝑡 = 0 is the 
announcement day of the M&A, as in Equation (3) below: 
 �𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 − 𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓�𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖�𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚 − 𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓�𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖
𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (3) 
The announcement period cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for acquirer 𝑖𝑖 is estimated as the sum 
of the risk-adjusted returns in the five-day window (𝑡𝑡 − 2 to 𝑡𝑡 + 2) surrounding the M&A’s 






For robustness, in line with numerous studies with similar sample characteristics (Fuller et al., 2002; 
Faccio et al., 2006; Barbopoulos et al., 2018a), the announcement period risk-adjusted returns for an 
acquiring firm 𝑖𝑖 are estimated using the market-adjusted model (MAM), the Carhart four-factor 
model (4-FM), the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), as well as the market model (MM). In 
unreported results (available from the authors upon request), the correlations between the acquirer 
CAR obtained from (a) the 3FF, (b) the 4-FM, (c) the CAPM, (d) the MM and (e) the MAM, are found 
10 
 
to be in excess of 0.92. All results using the acquirer CAR obtained from (b), (c), (d) and (e) are 
qualitatively similar to those obtained from (a), and the conclusions hold regardless of which event 
study model is applied. 
 
3.2. Propensity Score Matching (PSM) and Rosenbaum bounds (RB) methods 
Observational studies differ from experimental ones in that randomization is not used to assign 
a treatment. Within the context of M&As, extant literature is concerned with understanding the 
motives and consequences of several mechanisms involved during the deal process, by examining 
the acquirer CAR as the response random variable. In this paper, earnouts are used in a small 
proportion of the sampled deals (=7.51%). This raises concerns as to whether a form of sample-
selection bias reduces the reliability of the derived results, or their causal interpretation, from both 
univariate and multiple regression tests. To accommodate such concerns, the Propensity Score 
Matching (PSM) method is used, through which the earnout effect is measured in isolation.15 
More specifically, implementing the PSM method allows for an unbiased causal inference by 
pairing treated (earnout-based) and control (non-earnout settled) sampled M&As based on 
observable pre-treatment characteristics and assessing differences between the two groups in a 
response random variable (i.e. CAR) (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002; Rosenbaum, 2009). In particular, 
PSM involves matching treated M&As to counterfactual/control ones that do not include the 
treatment (earnout), yet they share a similar propensity to include it. 
The PSM is applied in three exercises. In Exercise 1 earnout-based deals (i.e. treated) are 
matched to non-earnout (i.e. control) ones within the full sample. Exercise 2 and Exercise 3 involve 
matching earnout to non-earnout deals within groups of deals announced by acquirers exhibiting 
only low sigma and only high sigma, respectively. As the propensity score estimators include sigma, 
performing these matching sequences enables us to match earnout-based M&As to counterfactual 
ones involving acquiring firms with the most similar expected release of acquirer-specific 
information during their announcement. Therefore, performing Exercises 2 and 3 allows us to 
measure the earnout effect, as well as how it varies between low- and high- sigma acquirers, 
separately. 
We apply 1-to-1, 5-to-1 and 10-to-1 nearest neighbour matching with replacement within 1% of 
Absolute Probability Difference (APD). The sensitivity of our conclusions, derived from each 
                                                 
15 Although PSM has become a popular method in estimating causal effects in policy impact research, it has only recently 
been used in the finance literature (Saunders and Steffen, 2011; Casu et al., 2013). Behr and Heid (2011) provide a thorough 
analysis of the PSM methodology along with its application in evaluating the success of German bank mergers in the period 
1995-2000. An analytic representation of the PSM method can also be found in Rosenbaum (2009), Chapters 3 and 7 to 13. 
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matching sequence, to the potential effect of an unobserved covariate from each propensity score 
estimator, is also examined through the Rosenbaum bounds method (Rosenbaum, 2009), which 
measures how influential a confounding (unobserved) covariate needs to be in order to invalidate 
the effect of the treatment on the response random variable. 
Finally, in response to the growing popularity of matching analyses in empirical finance, Ho et 
al. (2007) argue that matching in itself is not an estimation method: once a matched sample 
(containing both the treated and counterfactual M&As) is established, an estimation procedure needs 
to be adopted to determine the factors influencing the treatment’s outcome. They recommend that 
researchers benefit from ‘their decades of experience with parametric models to adjust the matched 
sample’ (p. 213). Particularly, matching on propensity scores is primarily used to balance the main 
covariates by simple t-tests on the matched sample (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; 1985).16 Then, 
parametric methods can be applied on the matched sample. 
 
3.3. Determinants of earnout choice 
The propensity scores used to perform the PSM exercises are estimated using three logit models 
(one for each exercise outlined in Section 3.2.). In particular, each logit model estimates the 
probability of a sampled deal being settled with an earnout conditional upon firm- and deal- specific 
characteristics, which will be regarded as ‘predicting’ the earnout choice. In the logit models, the 
dependent variable assumes the value of one if a deal is earnout-based, and zero otherwise. 
Extant literature on the earnout effect illustrates that earnouts are regularly used in acquisitions 
of private or subsidiary target firms, operating in intangible-rich sectors or unrelated industries, and 
characterized by substantial valuation risk, mainly sourced from adverse selection and moral hazard 
considerations (Kohers and Ang, 2000). Mantecon (2009) also demonstrates that the probability of 
earnout use is significantly lower when the deal involves a foreign target firm, while Datar et al. 
(2001) illustrate that common law countries facilitate, to a great extent, contractual agreements, thus 
increasing the likelihood of earnout choice. In addition, the acquirer’s growth opportunities, as 
measured by its market-to-book (MTBV) ratio (Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003), the relative size of 
the deal (Fuller et al., 2002), and the acquirer’s debt-to-equity (total debt to common equity) and 
cash (cash and cash equivalents to its total assets) ratios (as in Barbopoulos et al., 2018a, 2018b) are 
found to be important determinants of earnout choice. 
                                                 
16 As PSM is based on matching relative to each deal’s propensity score to exhibit the treatment, and not on each deal’s 
separate covariate’s effect on the probability of its occurrence, the covariates’ balance is tested between treated and control 
deals once matching is completed. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) illustrate that a two-sample t-test among the distribution 
of covariates between the treated and control groups offers a sufficient diagnostic to determine covariate balance. 
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To account for these effects in the prediction of earnout choice in our logit models, the following 
variables are included: (a) dummy variables that account for the listing status of the target (private 
dummy = 1, and = 0 otherwise), the intangibility of the target firm’s assets (Target in Intangible-rich 
sector = 1, and = 0 otherwise), the industrial diversification aspect of the deal (Diversifying deal = 1, 
and = 0 otherwise), the geographical diversification aspect of the deal (Foreign deal = 1, and = 0 
otherwise), the legal system of the target firm’s origin (Common Law = 1, and = 0 otherwise), and (b) 
continuous variables that account for the relative size of the deal, the acquirer’s MTBV, debt-to-equity 
ratio, cash ratio and sigma. 
 
3.4. Acquirer idiosyncratic stock return volatility (sigma) 
Moeller et al. (2007) illustrate the role of an acquiring firm’s sigma in shaping its CAR during the 
announcement period of M&As. As in Moeller et al. (2007), sigma is estimated as the standard 
deviation of the residuals from the Fama and French (1996) three-factor model that is estimated 
from 𝑡𝑡 − 205 days before the M&A announcement to 𝑡𝑡 − 6, where 𝑡𝑡 = 0 is the M&A announcement 
day. The market model, market-adjusted model, CAPM and the Carhart (1997) four-factor model are 
also used as robustness checks, whereas the results remain qualitatively and quantitatively similar 
to the ones in the main tests. 
 
3.5. Determinants of acquirers’ risk-adjusted returns: A multivariate analysis 
The impact of acquirers’ sigma on acquirers’ CAR from earnout- vs. non-earnout- settled deals is 
examined within a multivariate framework where the effects of several factors known to shape 
acquirers’ CAR are simultaneously controlled. Equation (5) is therefore estimated in a nested 
regression form: 
 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽2  × Earnout dummy𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3  ×  Unlisted Target dummy𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4  
×  Target in Intangible-rich Sector dummy𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5  
×  Diversifying M&A dummy𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6  × Foreign target dummy𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7  
×  Acquirer sigma𝑖𝑖 + �𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗
𝑘𝑘
𝑗𝑗=8
+ ?̃?𝑑𝑡𝑡 + ?̃?𝑐𝑠𝑠 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖        𝑖𝑖 = 1 …𝑁𝑁 
(5) 
where the intercept, 𝛽𝛽1, accounts for the average acquirer CAR after accounting for the effects of all 
the explanatory variables entering the matrix 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 . The dependent variable, CAR, is the five-day 
announcement period cumulative risk-adjusted return of acquirers as calculated in Equation (4). The 
impact of each of the explanatory variables entering the 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗  matrix is gathered in the vector 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗. 
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Earnout dummy: Prior studies indicate that earnout-based deals yield greater CAR to acquirers 
(Kohers and Ang, 2000; Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam, 2012; Barbopoulos et al., 2018b). To account 
for the potential implications of earnout choice on acquirers’ CAR, a variable assigned the value of 
one when an earnout is employed in the deal, and zero otherwise, is included in Equation (5). 
Unlisted target dummy: Extant literature has illustrated the influence of the target firm’s listing 
status on acquirers’ CAR (Chang, 1998; Fuller et al., 2002). To accommodate this effect in the analysis, 
a dummy variable taking the value of one for unlisted targets, and zero otherwise, is included in 
Equation (5). 
Target in intangible-rich sector dummy: The valuation risk confronting the acquirer in an M&A 
deal increases with the extent of intangibility inherent in the target firm’s assets (Kohers and Ang, 
2000). To account for this effect in the analysis, a dummy variable taking the value of one if the target 
firm operates within the consumer products and services, financials, healthcare, high-tech, media 
and entertainment, and telecommunications sectors, and zero otherwise, is included in Equation (5). 
Diversifying deal dummy: If both target and acquirer firms belong to the same sector, their 
integration may be easier and the synergy gains higher (Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam, 2012). 
However, firms acquiring targets that operate in an unrelated business may gain from diversification, 
thereby resulting in a reduction in the volatility of the combined firm’s cash flows and cost of capital. 
Therefore, to control for the potential effect of corporate diversification in our multivariate tests, a 
dummy variable that is assigned the value of one for diversifying deals (i.e. target and acquirer do 
not share the same two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code), and zero for focused 
deals, is included in Equation (5). 
Foreign target dummy: Domestic and foreign deals have been illustrated to affect the acquirers’ 
CAR differently (Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005; Barbopoulos et al., 2012). In general, domestic 
target acquisitions can be perceived as less risky compared to foreign target acquisitions. Therefore, 
to control for the effect of foreign target acquisitions in our multivariate tests, a dummy variable that 
is assigned the value of one when acquirer and target reside in different countries, and zero 
otherwise, is included in Equation (5). 
Acquirer sigma (Sigma): Moeller et al. (2007) examine the link between the theoretical 
predictions of information asymmetry models in explaining acquirers’ CAR. The authors illustrate 
the superiority of sigma as a proxy for information asymmetry over a publicly traded firm and its 
significance in shaping the distribution of acquirers’ CAR. Therefore, to proxy for the extent of the 




Relative deal size: Extant literature (Asquith et al., 1983; Fuller et al., 2002) depicts that 
acquirers’ gains are positively related to the relative size of the deal (measured as the deal value over 
the market value of the acquirer 20 days prior to the announcement day). Therefore, to account for 
this effect in the analysis, the relative size of the deal is included in Equation (5). 
Acquirer’s age: Information asymmetry between acquirers’ managers and investors influences 
acquirers’ CAR. Zhang (2006) suggests that investors tend to have more information on firms with a 
longer trading history, which results in lower information asymmetry. Therefore, as an alternative 
(to sigma) proxy for information asymmetry over a publicly traded firm, the age of the acquirer 
(measured by the log of the number of days between the announcement day and the first record of 
the company in Datastream) is included in Equation (5). 
Additional indicator and continuous variables: In Equation (5), two additional dummy variables 
are included indicating deals involving low- and high-sigma acquirers, respectively. Low sigma (High 
sigma) = one for the bottom (top) third of all deals in the sample based on their ranking by sigma, 
and zero otherwise. Lastly, key financial ratios of the acquiring firm, such as its market-to-book ratio 
(Acq. Market-to-Book Ratio), its ratio of ‘total cash and cash equivalents’ to total assets (Acq. Cash 
Ratio) and its ratio of total debt-to-common equity (Acq. Debt/Equity Ratio), are included in 
Equation (5). 
Year and target industry fixed effects: To account for potential unobserved time-variant 
characteristics related to a given year in which an M&A is announced, as well as unobserved 
characteristics specific to the target’s primary sector of business operations, ‘time fixed effects’ (?̃?𝑑𝑡𝑡) 
and ‘target industry fixed effects’ (?̃?𝑐𝑠𝑠), respectively, are included in Equation (5). 
 
4. DATA AND SAMPLE STATISTICS 
4.1. Data 
The sample includes M&As announced by US public firms between 01/01/1980 and 
31/12/2016 and recorded by the Security Data Corporation (SDC). In order for a deal to remain in 
the sample, it must meet the following criteria: first, the acquirer is a US listed firm and has a market 
value of at least $1m, measured 20 trading days prior to the announcement of the deal. To avoid the 
trivial effects of tiny deals, the transaction value is restricted to at least $1m. Targets of public, 
private and subsidiary listing and from all domiciles (US or non-US) are included in the sample. 
To avoid the confounding effects of multiple deals, deals announced within the five days 
surrounding another deal by the same acquirer are excluded. The daily stock price and market 
value of the acquirer need to be available from Datastream. Spin-offs, recapitalizations, self-
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tenders, exchange offers and repurchases are excluded from the sample. Deals where either acquirer 
or target firm belong to the sector ‘Government and Agencies’ are excluded from the sample. 
Finally, considering the method of financing the M&A, the percentage of the payment made with 
an unknown payment method, according to SDC, must be less than 100% so that the sum of cash, 
stock and other payments equals 100%. The above criteria are satisfied by 35,121 deals, 2,638 of 
which (= 7.51%) are earnout-based ones (i.e. the earnout sample). 
 
4.2. Sample statistics 
Table 1 presents the annual distribution of the sampled M&As for the full sample (Panel A), the 
earnout sample (Panel B) and the sample of private target M&As (Panel C), by several deal- and firm- 
specific features. Among other noticeable patterns, the statistics indicate that from 1999 to 2003 the 
majority of all M&As (Panel A), as well as the majority of earnout-based M&As (Panel B), were 
announced by acquirers exhibiting high sigma. Interestingly, Panel C shows that during the 1986-
1998 period (with the exception of the year 1996) the majority of deals involving private targets 
were based in earnouts, as opposed to stock. Consistent with Table 1, Figure 1 illustrates that the 
relative earnout activity (i.e. earnout activity over all M&A activity) steadily increases over the period 
between 1996 and 2011. Figure 1 also highlights that since 1996, the relative earnout value (i.e. the 
ratio of the aggregate value of the deferred payments in earnout-based M&As over the aggregate 
value of all M&As) also increases. The gradually higher relative earnout value is possibly the outcome 
of the record growth of M&As involving hard-to-evaluate target firms operating in the hi-tech and 
other intangible-rich sectors over the same period, which suggests the higher valuation risk faced by 
acquirers (consistent with Cain et al., 2011). 
(Insert Table 1 and Figure 1 about here) 
Table 1 also provides statistics on acquirer-, target-, and deal- specific features. Consistent with 
previous studies on the US market for corporate control (Moeller et al., 2004), Panel A demonstrates 
that the majority of M&As involve unlisted targets (private and subsidiary targets account for 48.83% 
and 26.90%, respectively). Considering the acquisition financing methods, cash payments dominate 
stock ones (35.27% vs. 22.81%). Moreover, 7.51% of the sampled deals are earnout-based and 
92.49% are settled in a single up-front payment delivery mechanism. Panel B further shows that 
nearly 40% (1,058 out of 2,638) of all earnout-based deals are announced by high-sigma acquirers. 
Lastly, consistent with prior studies (Kohers and Ang, 2000), Panel C shows that almost 98% of 




In Table 2 (Panel A) earnout-based deals appear to involve relatively more targets operating in 
intangible-rich sectors (77.52% in earnout deals compared to 68.63% in non-earnout ones). Earnout-
based deals also appear to be much smaller in transaction value than non-earnout settled deals 
($133m in earnout deals compared to $424m in non-earnout deals) and to involve smaller acquirers 
($4,175m in earnout-deals compared to $5,728m in non-earnout deals). However, the relative size 
of earnout-based deals is invariably greater than that of deals settled in cash, thereby indicating the 
increased risk faced by acquirers (Panels A to D). The above findings are in line with prior earnout 
studies (Kohers and Ang, 2000; Mantecon, 2009; Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam, 2012) indicating the 
suitability of earnout in risky deals involving mainly domestic unlisted target firms, operating in 
intangible-rich sectors. 
(Insert Table 2 about here) 
Panel A also verifies the (marginally) increased sigma characterizing acquirers in earnout-based 
deals, relative to acquirers in non-earnout settled M&As (0.039 in earnout deals, compared to 0.036 
in non-earnout deals). In Panels B, C and D, the above statistics are repeated for deals involving low-
, medium-, and high- sigma acquirers, respectively. A firm’s sigma has been portrayed as an accurate 
measure of the extent of information asymmetry between its managers and outside investors 
(Dierkens, 1991). Nevertheless, when leverage increases, shareholders bear a greater share of the 
total risk of the firm, and the volatility of the stock return increases. Myers (1977) illustrates that 
firm leverage affects investment decisions due to debt overhang considerations. As can be observed 
in Panels A to C, acquiring firms in earnout-based deals exhibit the lowest debt-to-equity ratio and 
the highest cash ratio, compared to counterparts in non-earnout settled deals. In Panel D, in turn, the 
leverage and liquidity positions of acquirers in earnout-based deals come second, following that of 
acquirers in stock-financed deals. These features are perceived as evidence that equity investors’ 
concerns over acquirers’ leverage and liquidity positions are unlikely to be substantial within 
earnout-based deals. 
Table 3 records the correlations between the variables in the analysis. In general, the correlation 
coefficients do not raise any concerns regarding multicollinearity that may impede the assessment 
of the effect of the independent variables in multiple regressions. 
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
 
5. THE RESULTS 
This section commences with a discussion of the results obtained from out univariate and 
multivariate tests, followed by the results obtained from the robustness checks addressing: (a) self-
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selection concerns with regards to the endogeneity inherent in employing earnouts (or not), and (b) 
size effect considerations. 
 
5.1. Univariate tests of acquirers’ risk-adjusted returns 
The results of the univariate tests are presented in Table 4. They are organized according to the 
deal’s method of payment and the target firm’s listing status for the full sample (Panel A), and for 
samples corresponding to deals announced by acquirers exhibiting low sigma (Panel B), medium 
sigma (Panel C) and high sigma (Panel D). Differentials between acquirers’ CAR from deals settled in 
earnouts vs. non-earnout are recorded within Panels A to D (rightmost columns), while Panel E 
records differentials between acquirers’ CAR from deals announced by high- vs. low- sigma acquirers 
(i.e. Panel D vs. Panel B). 
Consistent with prior studies (Kohers and Ang, 2000; Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam, 2012), 
acquirers in earnout-based deals enjoy a 0.45% higher CAR, compared to counterparts in non-
earnout deals (Panel A). Panel A also reveals that acquirers’ CAR in earnout-based deals outperform 
those from deals settled in cash (stock) by 0.69% (0.42%). Therefore, M&As in which the settlement 
of the deal’s consideration carries contingent properties significantly outperform those lacking such 
properties (Hansen, 1987; Kohers and Ang, 2000). Along similar lines, earnout-based deals involving 
private targets outperform their cash-settled counterparts by 0.42%, perhaps due to the adequacy 
(inadequacy) of earnouts (cash) in deals exhibiting high valuation risk. Moreover, in line with 
information asymmetry models (Moeller et al., 2007), Panel D shows that stock-settled public target 
deals that are announced by high-sigma acquirers are associated with significant losses (-2.32%) and 
that high-sigma acquirers of (a) private or subsidiary targets, irrespective of the deal’s payment 
delivery mechanism or payment method, and (b) public targets financed with cash, enjoy significant 
CAR. 
(Insert Table 4 about here) 
The results further show that acquirers’ higher CAR accrued from earnout- rather than non-
earnout- settled deals (0.45%, Panel A) is shaped by deals announced by acquirers exhibiting low 
sigma (1.02%, Panel B), rather than high sigma (-0.33%, Panel D). This offers, to some extent, 
convincing evidence suggesting that earnouts do not appear to be perceived as superior in terms of 
wealth creation in the majority of the deals they are involved. Consistent with our main hypothesis, 
the results convey that the earnout effect in deals announced by high-sigma acquirers is potentially 
distorted (or elusive) due to the presence of the acquirer-specific information revelation effect.17 
                                                 
17 As high-sigma acquirers are subject to high information asymmetry, the dissemination of non-M&A-related acquirer-
specific information through the announcement of the deal ultimately leads to a substantial re-appraisal of their value, 
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By contrast, under low sigma, acquirers in earnout-based M&As appear to significantly 
outperform their non-earnout counterparts.18 As suggested by our theoretical predictions, this is 
likely due to the earnout effect not being elusive (or being materially less so) due to the absence (or 
considerably limited presence) of the acquirer-specific information revelation effect. The results 
therefore suggest that the extent of elusiveness of the earnout effect on acquirers’ CAR (recorded in 
the rightmost columns on Panels A to D in Table 4) varies with acquirers’ sigma. 
Finally, Panel E records differentials between acquirers’ CAR in M&As announced by high- and 
low- sigma acquirers. On average, high-sigma acquirers enjoy significantly higher CAR than low-
sigma acquirers (consistent with Moeller et al., 2007). This finding may also be regarded as being in 
line with evidence suggesting that acquirers’ gains during the announcement of M&As are affected 
by their size (Moeller et al., 2004), given the considerable disparities in the market values of high- 
and low- sigma acquirers (see also Table 2). Nevertheless, comparing the impact of earnouts across 
deals involving private targets and announced by low- and high- sigma acquirers reveals an 
insignificant difference of 0.42%, in contrast to what would be expected under the presence of a size 
effect. It could therefore be argued that, whereas under high acquirer sigma the earnout effect is 
likely elusive, under low acquirer sigma the earnout effect is likely considerable, ultimately rendering 
the performance of the two portfolios of deals (i.e. deals involving high-sigma acquirers and private 
targets, and deals involving low-sigma acquirers and private targets) indistinguishable.19 By contrast, 
low-sigma acquirers of private targets using single up-front payments significantly underperform 
their high-sigma counterparts. 
Put together, these results suggest the presence of a strong interaction between the earnout 
effect and the acquirer-specific information revelation effect in shaping acquirers’ CAR. In particular, 
these findings are consistent with the predictions of our main hypothesis, which is in turn based on 
information asymmetry models that were put forward by Moeller et al. (2007). While self-selection 
issues may distort the strength and direction of the results, the earnout effect is isolated from the 
acquirer information revelation effect via the PSM method, which is performed later in the paper. 
 
                                                 
which need not be exclusively reflective of the economic benefits of the deal (Moeller et al., 2004; Draper and Paudyal, 
2008). 
18 Panel B also shows that low-sigma acquirers in earnout-based deals significantly outperform their cash and stock 
counterparts by 0.84% and 1.55%, respectively, which is mainly due to deals involving unlisted targets. 




5.2. Cross-sectional analysis of acquirers’ risk-adjusted returns 
Table 5 records the estimates of the multivariate tests, which account for the impact of several 
factors that are likely to affect acquirers’ CAR. As reflected in the intercepts of all models in Table 5, 
once controlling for the effects of deal- and firm- specific factors, the average acquirer breaks even 
(depending on the model specification, the intercept terms are either positive or negative, yet 
statistically insignificant). This is partially consistent with previous evidence reported by Asquith et 
al. (1983), Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) and Moeller et al. (2004). Unlisted target M&As yield 
significant gains to acquirers’ shareholders of about 3% (across all models) (Fuller et al. (2002), 
Faccio et al. (2006) and Barbopoulos et al. (2018b)). The estimates further indicate that relatively 
large deals add value to acquirers (across all models), as do deals involving mature acquirers (Models 
4, 6, 8, 10 and 12) (see Asquith et al., 1983 and Fuller et al., 2002). Moreover, as in Sudarsanam and 
Mahate (2003), ‘glamour’ acquirers destroy value (across all models).20 In addition, the results 
(Model 1) confirm the superiority of sigma, compared to the acquirer’s age, as a proxy for information 
asymmetry over a publicly traded firm. Finally, consistent with Denis et al. (2002) and Moeller and 
Schlingemann (2005), engaging in foreign target M&As, as well as industry diversifying ones, adds 
value to acquirers. 
The estimates of Models 1 and 2 show that acquirers in earnout-based deals appear to break 
even, as captured by the coefficient of the ‘Earnout’ dummy in each model. Consistent with Moeller 
et al. (2007), estimates reported in Model 2 convey that high- (low-) sigma acquirers are associated 
with positive (negative) CAR. Further results show that the earnout dummy, in conjunction with 
either low or high sigma, is associated with significant valuation effects for acquirers’ shareholders.21 
Specifically, earnout-based M&As announced by low-sigma acquirers (Model 3) are associated with 
strictly positive gains, whereas Model 4 suggests the opposite outcome for earnout-based M&As 
announced by high-sigma acquirers (coefficients of 0.751 and –0.959, respectively). These results 
corroborate our findings from the univariate tests. 
(Insert Table 5 about here) 
Further evidence shows that low-sigma acquirers of unlisted targets are perceived to enjoy 
significant gains (Model 5), whereas their high-sigma counterparts appear to experience significant 
losses (Model 6). In addition, low-sigma acquirers of intangible-rich targets seem to break even 
(Model 7), whereas their high-sigma counterparts are linked with significant losses (Model 8). 
                                                 
20 Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) illustrate that glamour acquirers, i.e. high market-to-book ratio firms or 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀 >  1, 
destroy value. 
21 Deals are sorted by the acquirer’s sigma to allow for the creation of two dummy variables (high sigma and low sigma). 
The high sigma (low sigma) dummy variable is assigned the value of one for the top (bottom) third of deals, exhibiting the 
highest (lowest) values of acquirer sigma, and zero otherwise. 
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Finally, low-sigma acquirers in diversifying deals also appear to break even (Model 9), whereas their 
high-sigma counterparts are perceived to experience significant losses (Model 10). These findings 
shed further light on the valuation implications of the interaction between the use of earnouts and 
acquirers’ sigma in M&As that involve targets that are unlisted and based in different (than the 
acquirer), or difficult-to-value, sectors. 
Overall, the results suggest that the perceived superior performance of earnout-based deals that 
has been uncovered by earlier studies (e.g. Kohers and Ang, 2000; Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam, 
2012) appears to be driven by deals announced by acquirers exhibiting low sigma, wherein the 
acquirer-specific information revelation effect is expected to be negligible.22 By contrast, under high 
sigma, consistent with our main hypothesis and the predictions of information asymmetry models 
(Moeller et al., 2007), it appears that it is the prevalence of the acquirer-specific information 
revelation effect that induces a positive wealth gain, irrespective of whether an earnout was used or 
not. Evidently, the extent to which acquirers’ CAR reflect the ability of earnouts to reduce adverse 
selection and moral hazard concerns in M&As appears to vary with the acquiring firm’s sigma. 
 
5.3. Addressing selection bias 
The impact of earnouts on acquirers’ CAR may be due to the pre-treatment characteristics of the 
treated group (earnout-based M&As), rather than to the impact of the treatment (the use of earnouts) 
per se. In experimental studies, where the two samples (the treated and control) are randomly 
assigned, the assessment of their comparative performance is free from such bias. However, in 
observational studies, such as ours, the assignment is non-random, which may affect the estimation 
of the treatment effect. To accommodate this concern in the analysis, the Propensity Score Matching 
(PSM) method is used, thereby allowing for the earnout effect to be measured in isolation. 
More specifically, PSM allows for an unbiased causal inference by pairing treated M&As 
(earnout-based) with control M&As (non-earnout-settled), based on a propensity score that is 
estimated at the deal-level via a logit model that includes observable pre-treatment features (see 
Section 3.3.). The propensity scores are estimated for the full sample, as well as within groups of 
M&As announced by low- and high- sigma acquirers, separately. Following the matching exercise 
(see Dehejia and Wahba (2002) and Rosenbaum (2009) for an application of the method) the 
acquirers’ CAR in the treated and control samples are compared.23 To ensure accuracy in the 
                                                 
22 This paper argues that the earnout effect could potentially be stronger in deals announced by high-sigma (small) 
acquirers, yet it is concealed by the acquirer-specific information revelation effect. 
23 Deals from the non-earnout group are selected based on the alternative Matching Ratios (MR) of 1-to-1, 5-to-1 and 10-
to-1 within 1% Absolute Probability Difference (APD). 
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matching process, the distributions of the covariates between the earnout (treated) and non-earnout 
(control) groups are tested for similarity. The output of the PSM analysis is recorded in Table 6 
(Univariate tests) and Table 7 (Multivariate tests). 
As can be seen in Table 6, the evaluation of the treatment effect (i.e. the earnout effect) is initially 
conducted within all deals (Model 1, defined as Exercise 1), as well as within deals announced by 
acquirers exhibiting low (Model 2, defined as Exercise 2) and high (Model 3, defined as Exercise 3) 
sigma, separately. Including sigma in its continuous form as a covariate term across all models, and 
particularly in Model 1, enables us to select counterfactual or control M&As (non-earnout-settled 
deals) that are highly likely to exhibit similar levels of acquirer-specific information dissemination at 
the time of their announcement as their treated earnout-based M&As. Consequently, examining 
differences in the outcome variable (i.e. acquirers’ CAR) between treated and control deals allows us 
to control for the acquirer-specific information revelation effect and, thus, capture the earnout effect, 
as well as observe how it varies across deals announced by acquirers exhibiting low or high sigma, 
separately. 
 
5.3.1. Addressing selection bias – Univariate tests of acquirers’ risk-adjusted returns 
Consistent with Kohers and Ang (2000) and Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam (2012), Models 1 to 
3 illustrate that earnouts are more likely to occur in relatively larger deals involving private targets 
that operate in intangible-rich sectors. Acquirers in such deals are expected to face high merger 
valuation risk, as a result of adverse selection and moral hazard concerns. Accordingly, as such 
considerations may manifest in the form of integration challenges and/or give rise to substantial 
disagreements between the merging firms over the deal’s payoff during the negotiation period, the 
use of earnouts is likely to be triggered.  
In Panel B the balance of covariates is presented. Across all models, the statistical properties of 
the covariates employed are similar (Panel B), thereby confirming successful matching sequences. 
The treatment effect is presented in Panel C. Model 1 confirms that, once controlling for sigma, 
acquirers employing earnouts appear to break even, relative to their control counterfactuals 
(statistically insignificant difference of 0.38%). Therefore, it seems that, upon addressing selection-
bias concerns, the impact of implementing earnouts on acquirers’ CAR that emerged from the 
univariate analysis (0.45% as reported in Table 4, Panel A) becomes negligible. 
Models 2 and 3 offer direct evidence on the superiority of earnouts in deals announced by 
acquirers exhibiting low sigma. The earnout effect is found positive and highly significant, as treated 
deals significantly outperform their untreated counterparts by 0.85% (Model 2). While this finding 
22 
 
corroborates earlier findings in both the univariate and multivariate tests, it offers strong support to 
our main hypothesis. Model 3 conveys that, under high acquirer sigma, earnout-based deals appear 
to be indistinguishable from their non-earnout counterparts in terms of the announcement period 
CAR. Therefore, upon addressing self-selection concerns, the insignificant earnout effect within deals 
announced by acquirers exhibiting high sigma persists. 
Finally, across all models, the estimates suggest that the impact of the treatment on acquirers’ 
CAR would be rendered negligible, or even flip sign, if an unobserved covariate caused the odds of 
treatment assignment to change by at least 5% (Model 1), 14% (Model 2) and 4% (Model 3), 
respectively.24 
(Insert Table 6 about here) 
 
5.3.2. Addressing selection bias – Cross-sectional tests of acquirers’ risk-adjusted returns 
Table 7 records the results that emerge once addressing self-selection concerns by means of 
multiple regression tests on the matched sample obtained from the PSM method. The sample is 
restricted to deals announced by low-sigma acquirers (Models 1 to 3) and high-sigma acquirers 
(Models 4 to 6), whereas the respective estimations include, as additional covariates, dummy 
variables that identify the matched counterfactual deals (according to Models 2 and 3, respectively, 
of Table 6). More specifically, two dummy variables are added (Control Dummy: Low sigma and 
Control Dummy: High sigma), which are assigned the value of one if a deal constitutes a control 
counterfactual from the matching exercise within each sigma group, and zero otherwise, respectively. 
A control deal constitutes a sample unit that does not receive the treatment (earnout) but, 
nevertheless, exhibits the same probability, as estimated through the PSM method, of receiving the 
treatment as a treated sampled unit. 
(Insert Table 7 about here) 
Models 1 to 3 reveal that low-sigma acquirers not implementing earnouts, despite exhibiting the 
same probability to do so as low-sigma acquirers that implement earnouts, experience marginally 
significant losses (Control Dummy: Low sigma = -0.006, -0.005 and -0.004, for Models 1 to 3, 
respectively). On the other hand, Models 4 to 6 reveal that high-sigma acquirers not implementing 
earnouts, despite exhibiting the same probability as high-sigma acquirers that implement earnouts, 
                                                 
24 The RB critical value of Γ at p = 0.10 is usually compared to the proportion of treatment frequencies within each model, 
which in turn constitutes the a priori probability of an observation belonging to the treated group. In this respect, the lower 
RB values, relative to the corresponding treatment frequencies, in Model 1 (2,094/28,371 = 7.38%) and in Model 3 
(726/7,964 = 9.12%) can be perceived as suggesting the tendency of the treatment effect to revamp. On the contrary, the 
high RB value (= 14%) in Model 2 exceeds the corresponding treatment frequencies (523/10,526 = 4.97%), suggesting the 
relatively limited exposure of the estimation and, hence, of the matching outcome to hidden or unobserved variable bias. 
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enjoy significant gains (Control Dummy: High sigma = 0.011, 0.013 and 0.013, for Models 4 to 6, 
respectively). 
Overall, this analysis allows us to elicit more robust estimates regarding the valuation effects of 
earnouts within matched deals announced by acquirers exhibiting similar levels of sigma. Evidently, 
once the acquirer-specific information revelation effect is held constant between earnout- and non-
earnout- settled deals, it is acquirers exhibiting low, rather than high, sigma that are perceived to 
enjoy higher risk-adjusted returns, relative to their non-earnout counterparts. 
 
5.4. Size effect considerations 
Prior studies suggest that firms exhibiting high sigma and, hence, greater information asymmetry 
between their managers and outside investors, are more likely to be small firms and vice versa (Banz, 
1981; Campbell et al., 2001; Moeller et al., 2004; Draper and Paudyal, 2008). Moeller et al. (2004) 
further identify the presence of a size effect in acquirers’ CAR, resulting in small acquirers enjoying 
significantly greater CAR during the announcement of M&As than large acquirers. In turn, our results 
presented so far indicate that, under increased information asymmetry (or high sigma) over the 
(likely small) acquiring firm , the earnout effect appears to be distorted (or elusive) due to an 
acquirer-specific information revelation effect, resulting from the heightened extent of information 
asymmetry between acquirers’ managers and outside investors. Thus, we are prompted to examine 
the possibility that the acquirer-specific information revelation effect could, in fact, be linked to the 
well-established size effect. Therefore, our analysis is now turned to study the exposure of the 
portfolio of both earnout- and non-earnout- based M&As, announced by either low- or high- sigma 
acquirers, to size effect considerations. 
The presence of a size effect would be suggested if an opposite sign between the average 
acquirer CAR and the weighted-by-market-value average acquirer CAR (=WCAR) is observed. Such 
an outcome would indicate that, as acquirers’ market values increase, the risk-adjusted returns 
reaped by their shareholders decrease. Consistent with Moeller et al. (2004), Table 8 reports that for 
all acquirers, the average acquirer CAR is 1.26%, while the WCAR is -0.63%, thereby suggesting the 
presence of a size effect. Panel A demonstrates that earnout-based deals, as a whole, are also exposed 
to a size effect, as indicated by the opposite signs between the respective average acquirer CAR and 
WCAR (1.68% and -0.16%, respectively). 
(Insert Table 8 about here) 
Nevertheless, within earnout-based M&As involving low- and medium- sigma acquirers (Panels 
B and C), we find that the CAR is of the same sign as the WCAR. This suggests that the exposure of 
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earnout-based M&As announced by non-high-sigma acquirers to a size-related discount and, hence, 
size effect considerations is limited or even absent, despite their considerably larger size ($13,718m 
and $2,336m under low and medium sigma, respectively, compared to $617m under high sigma). 
Hence, the results indicate that the selection of earnouts by large acquirers with low information 
asymmetry sends a strong signal for value creation that also prevents the occurrence of a size-related 
discount. On the contrary, we find that the CAR and WCAR differ in sign for deals announced by 
acquirers exhibiting high sigma (Panel D) (2.49% and -4.52%, respectively). This suggests the 
substantial exposure of earnout-based deals, announced by acquirers exhibiting high sigma, to a size 
effect. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER DISCUSSION 
We trace the interaction between the acquiring firm’s information environment (measured by 
its idiosyncratic stock return volatility or sigma), the choice of earnouts as the payment delivery 
mechanism in M&As, and the statistical properties of acquirers’ risk-adjusted returns in the 
announcement period. The analysis is motivated by several interesting features of earnout-based 
M&As, such as the generally small size of acquirers and their heightened levels of sigma. Confronted 
with prior evidence suggesting that information asymmetry over the acquiring firm influences 
acquirers’ risk-adjusted returns (Moeller et al., 2007), concerns are raised as to whether the earnout 
effect could in fact be distorted (or elusive) due to the release of acquirer-specific information during 
the announcement of the deal. Accordingly, we set out to test the interaction between the earnout 
effect and the acquirer-specific information revelation effect in shaping acquirers’ CAR using a 
standard event-study methodology, as well as a quasi-experimental design through which the 
earnout effect is examined in isolation. 
Our results suggest that the well-documented superior announcement period gains accrued to 
acquirers in earnout- vs. non-earnout- settled M&As are mainly detected in deals involving low-sigma 
acquirers. By contrast, high-sigma acquirers are perceived to break even, or experience losses, when 
using earnouts, relative to non-earnout payments. Our PSM results further confirm these findings, as 
it is exclusively under low acquirer sigma that earnout-based M&As are perceived to significantly 
outperform their counterfactual deals. Lastly, as low-sigma acquirers are likely to be much larger 
firms than high-sigma acquirers, we examine the likely presence of size effect considerations within 
the portfolios of deals announced by acquirers exhibiting low, medium and high sigma. In contrast to 
deals settled in single up-front payments, the results do not suggest the presence of a size effect 
within the portfolio of low-sigma acquirers using earnouts. 
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We argue that the most realistic explanation associated with our results is the presence 
(absence) of an acquirer-specific information revelation effect in deals announced by acquirers 
exhibiting high sigma (low sigma), ultimately rendering the comparative performance of earnout- 
and non-earnout- based deals elusive (apparent). It is important to be mentioned that our findings 
should not be regarded as suggesting that there is no synergy potential in earnout-based deals 
involving high-sigma acquirers, or that earnout contracts are not incentive-compatible in such M&A 
negotiations. However, our results do suggest that, under high acquirer sigma, the earnout effect is 
likely to be elusive. It would thus be highly unwarranted to infer an earnout-based deal’s likelihood 





Appendix A. Variable definitions 
 
Variable Definition Source 
All Refers to the entire sample analysed in this paper. SDC 
Earnout  
Dummy = 1 when payment includes earnout in addition to 
cash, stock or mixed, and = 0 otherwise (= Non-Earnout) 
(NEA). 
SDC 
NEA Dummy = 1 when payment does not include earnout, and = 0 otherwise (= Earnout). SDC 
Cash Dummy = 1 when payment is 100% cash. SDC 
Stock Dummy = 1 when payment is 100% stock. SDC 
Mixed Dummy = 1 when payment is a combination of cash, stock and other payments (excluding earnouts) SDC 
Foreign 
Dummy = 1 with a US acquirer and non-US target, and = 0 
when both acquirer and target are US institutions (= 
Domestic). 
SDC 
Domestic Dummy = 1 when both acquirer and target are US institutions, and = 0 otherwise (= Foreign).  
Target under Common law 
Dummy = 1 when the acquisition is cross-border and the 
target's nation follows the English Common law legal system, 
and = 0 otherwise. 
SDC 
Focused Dummy = 1 when acquirer and target share the same two-digit SIC code, and = 0 otherwise.  
Diversifying Dummy = 1 when acquirer and target do not share the same two-digit SIC code, and = 0 otherwise. SDC 
Deal value  Bid’s transaction value, in millions of dollars. SDC 
Earnout value The deal’s value, in millions of dollars, of the deferred payment in an earnout-based M&A  SDC 
Rel. earnout value The bid’s relative earnout size (= earnout value/deal value) SDC 
Private target Dummy = 1 if target is a private firm, and = 0 otherwise. SDC 
Subsidiary target Dummy = 1 if target is a subsidiary firm, and = 0 otherwise. SDC 
Unlisted target Dummy = 1 if target is not a listed firm, and = 0 otherwise. SDC 
Public target Dummy = 1 if target is a listed firm, and = 0 otherwise. SDC 
Target in int. sector 
Dummy = 1 when target belongs to a high intangible assets 
industry (consumer products and services, financials, 
healthcare, high-tech, media and entertainment, and 
telecommunications) and = 0 otherwise. 
SDC 
Target in high-tech Dummy = 1 if target belongs to the high technology industry, and = 0 otherwise. SDC 
Target in cons. & serv. Dummy = 1 if target belongs to the Consumer Products and Services industry, and = 0 otherwise. SDC 
Target in med. & ent. Dummy = 1 if target belongs to the Media and Entertainment 
industry, and = 0 otherwise. SDC 
Target in telecoms Dummy = 1 if target belongs to the Telecommunications 
industry, and = 0 otherwise. SDC 
Target in financials Dummy = 1 if target belongs to the Financials industry, and = 0 
otherwise. SDC 
Target in retail Dummy = 1 if target belongs to the Retail industry, and = 0 
otherwise. SDC 
Relative deal size  Ratio of Deal Value to Acq. MV (Deal Value/ Acq. MV). SDC & Datastream 





Continued (Appendix A) 
 
Variable Definition Source 
Acq. debt/equity ratio Acquirer’s total debt to common equity measured at the end of the last quarter prior to the deal’s announcement. Datastream 
Acq. cash ratio 
Acquirer's total cash and cash equivalents to its total assets 
measured at the end of the last quarter prior to the deal’s 
announcement 
Datastream 
Sigma Acquirer’s idiosyncratic stock return volatility (Measured as in Moeller et al., 2007) Datastream 
High sigma  Dummy = 1 if a sample deal belongs to the top third of deals based on their distribution of sigma. Datastream 
Low sigma Dummy = 1 if a sample deal belongs to the bottom third of deals based on their distribution of sigma. Datastream 
Acq. MV Acquirer’s market value of equity at four weeks prior to the bid’s announcement, in millions of dollars. Datastream 
Acq. MTBV Acquirer’s market-to-book value estimated four weeks prior to the deal announcement. Datastream 
Control Dummy: Low sigma 
Dummy = 1 for deals that were control counterfactuals in PSM 
Exercise 2 (see Sections 3.2. and 5.3. for information on the 
formulation of the matching sequence), and = 0 otherwise.  
Authors’ 
calculations 
Control Dummy: High sigma 
Dummy = 1 for deals that were control counterfactuals in PSM 
Exercise 3 (see Sections 3.2. and 5.3. for information on the 




The table defines the variables used in the empirical analysis and indicates the data source used. SDC denotes Thomson-
Reuters SDC M&A database. With a dummy variable, a sample observation without the value of one has the value of zero. 
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Table 1 Annual distribution of M&A activities 
 
 Panel A: All M&As Panel B: All Earnout-Based M&As Panel C: Private Target M&As 























1980 36 0 24 18 2 19 10 6 2 36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1981 256 0 160 150 18 140 73 2 2 256 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1982 359 0 215 211 22 190 90 0 0 359 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1983 508 4 304 193 69 240 116 6 0 508 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1984 599 4 299 311 55 237 184 21 11 599 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1985 292 10 166 199 22 55 165 159 69 283 9 0 4 5 3 5 2 5 3 60 20 3 15 
1986 296 11 131 159 23 94 146 123 97 288 8 0 3 3 0 5 1 5 0 0 52 7 13 
1987 357 18 162 165 46 102 191 153 108 348 9 1 3 2 1 7 0 7 1 14 52 5 10 
1988 345 24 173 60 113 76 198 161 83 335 10 4 8 3 4 7 0 7 2 29 24 10 42 
1989 522 43 234 263 85 158 198 214 162 495 27 2 16 8 9 14 2 14 5 36 67 8 12 
1990 414 31 184 165 96 141 134 160 115 392 22 5 12 4 7 15 2 15 6 40 51 10 20 
1991 510 61 210 119 217 221 138 143 167 470 40 12 22 3 20 29 1 29 17 59 82 44 54 
1992 744 78 296 207 259 366 163 192 260 699 45 6 21 13 21 30 1 30 15 50 150 51 34 
1993 987 77 409 299 397 488 211 276 360 917 70 7 38 7 38 46 1 46 29 63 213 91 43 
1994 1,259 111 507 396 437 636 315 378 417 1,201 58 1 37 9 30 45 0 45 24 53 218 86 39 
1995 1,337 144 506 432 409 630 381 403 486 1,281 56 6 24 7 25 40 1 40 18 45 245 98 40 
1996 1,570 158 653 439 596 825 369 427 581 1,509 61 10 30 9 27 41 2 41 20 49 360 190 53 
1997 2,048 201 896 578 779 1,061 468 567 687 1,946 102 14 52 10 56 82 1 82 45 55 377 199 53 
1998 2,139 284 916 482 802 1,119 549 632 696 2,008 131 21 63 16 63 95 3 95 49 52 375 174 46 
1999 1,811 223 766 191 1,024 884 542 544 673 1,717 94 8 57 3 66 67 3 67 49 73 378 286 76 
2000 1,812 247 772 82 1,243 969 478 483 735 1,701 111 15 46 0 84 80 3 80 64 80 464 401 86 
2001 1,225 184 528 68 771 532 353 404 355 1,131 94 17 52 3 68 68 2 68 50 74 168 141 84 
2002 1,118 160 485 211 561 505 249 450 206 1,010 108 11 50 5 65 80 1 80 47 59 107 87 81 
2003 992 123 395 248 393 464 242 420 185 881 111 13 46 16 57 80 2 80 44 55 81 59 73 
2004 1,246 199 483 476 402 668 247 558 177 1,116 130 29 49 31 52 101 2 101 44 44 84 63 75 
2005 1,384 228 585 586 358 764 230 635 181 1,261 123 22 48 35 34 92 3 92 27 29 97 74 76 
2006 1,385 226 614 589 296 745 265 703 151 1,243 142 22 52 43 35 108 3 108 27 25 76 52 68 
2007 1,356 247 579 604 303 738 268 650 162 1,193 163 20 70 55 36 124 2 124 29 23 82 55 67 
2008 967 192 401 255 317 504 193 460 117 828 139 33 59 25 47 109 6 109 40 37 51 42 82 
2009 700 139 281 52 403 315 165 301 123 613 87 15 37 3 52 66 3 66 37 56 46 34 74 
2010 819 180 341 329 209 399 168 415 103 718 101 25 32 33 26 69 2 69 18 26 47 42 89 
2011 866 198 386 390 220 450 140 426 101 746 120 27 44 35 35 94 0 94 26 28 57 46 81 
2012 882 194 391 444 154 415 155 483 73 777 105 21 43 43 17 78 2 78 12 15 29 21 72 
2013 794 143 334 492 112 384 157 423 88 706 88 17 30 46 15 61 2 61 12 20 43 28 65 
2014 1,029 189 421 601 175 545 188 511 130 919 110 19 50 45 27 85 1 85 21 25 62 38 61 
2015 1,201 226 568 723 161 605 216 316 87 1,109 92 23 37 40 18 70 2 70 13 19 36 16 44 
2016 956 161 471 520 158 464 169 182 61 884 72 11 44 26 20 54 1 54 14 26 19 10 53 
Total 35,121 4,718 15,246 11,707 11,707 17,148 8,524 12,387 8,011 32,483 2,638 437 1,179 586 1,058 1,947 57 1,947 808 - 4,214 2,471 - 
% - 13.43 43.41 33.33 33.33 48.83 24.27 35.27 22.81 92.49 - 16.57 44.69 22.21 40.11 73.81 2.16 - 41.50 - - 58.64 - 
 
Panel A refers to all M&As included in the analysis; Panel B refers to only earnout-based M&As; Panel C refers to solely private target M&As settled in earnout or stock. ‘All’ refers to the entire M&A activity (within each panel); ‘Foreign’ (within each panel) 
refers to foreign target acquisitions in which the acquirer and target are based in different countries; ‘Diversifying’ (within each panel) refers to diversifying deals in which the acquirer and target operate in different industries, i.e. they do not share the 
same two-digit SIC code; ‘Low sigma’ (within each panel) corresponds to the bottom third of deals exhibiting the lowest acquirer sigma; ‘High sigma’ (within each panel) corresponds to the top third of deals exhibiting the highest acquirer sigma; ‘Cash’ 
refers to deals fully settled in cash; ‘Stock’ refers to deals fully settled in stock; ‘Private target’ (within each panel) refers to M&A deals in which the target is a private firm; ‘Public target’ (within each panel) refers to M&A deals in which the target firm is a 
publicly listed firm; ‘NEA’ (Panel A) refers to all deals that are not earnout-based (i.e. fully settled in cash, stock or mixed payments); ‘Earnout’ (Panel C) refers to deals that are earnout-based; ‘Earnout high sigma’ refers to earnout-based deals announced 




Table 2 Summary statistics 
 
 Panel A: All Deals Panel B: Low-Sigma Acquirers Panel C: Medium-Sigma Acquirers Panel D: High-Sigma Acquirers 
 All Earnout NEA Cash Stock All Earnout NEA Cash Stock All Earnout NEA Cash Stock All Earnout NEA Cash Stock 
All deals 35,121 2,638 32,483 12,387 8,011 11,707 586 11,121 5,278 1,899 11,707 994 10,713 4,579 2,216 11,707 1,058 10,649 2,530 3,896 
Private target 17,148 1,947 15,201 4,786 4,214 4,488 400 4,088 1,765 681 5,600 739 4,861 1,880 1,062 7,060 808 6,252 1,141 2,471 
Public target 8,524 57 8,467 2,888 2,973 3,824 18 3,806 1,515 1,093 2,888 17 2,871 967 958 1,812 22 1,790 406 922 
Subsidiary target 9,449 634 8,815 4,713 824 3,395 168 3,227 1,998 125 3,219 238 2,981 1,732 196 2,835 228 2,607 983 503 
Domestic  30,403 2,201 28,202 10,096 7,296 10,088 460 9,628 4,224 1,827 10,209 835 9,374 3,748 2,069 10,106 906 9,200 2,124 3,400 
Foreign  4,718 437 4,281 2,291 715 1,619 126 1,493 1,054 72 1,498 159 1,339 831 147 1,601 152 1,449 406 496 
Focused  19,875 1,459 18,416 6,806 4,955 6,361 314 6,047 2,622 1,372 6,942 562 6,380 2,690 1,439 6,572 583 5,989 1,494 2,144 
Diversifying  15,246 1,179 14,067 5,581 3,056 5,346 272 5,074 2,656 527 4,765 432 4,333 1,889 777 5,135 475 4,660 1,036 1,752 
Target in int. sector 24,339 2,045 22,294 8,146 6,524 7,531 447 7,084 3,214 1,525 8,014 747 7,267 3,090 1,832 8,794 851 7,943 1,842 3,167 
Sigma 0.036 0.039 0.036 0.027 0.050 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.025 0.026 0.025 0.025 0.026 0.070 0.066 0.071 0.058 0.081 
Deal value ($m) 402.6 133.3 424.4 254.5 508.6 784.5 313.5 809.3 435.0 1,202.1 310.1 124.2 327.4 157.6 501.2 113.1 42.1 120.1 53.5 174.9 
Acq. MV ($m) 5,611.5 4,174.7 5,728.2 8,999.2 4,655.2 11,273.8 13,717.7 11,145.1 15,848.6 7,005.5 4,487.6 2,335.9 4,687.2 5,134.8 8,405.9 1,073.1 616.7 1,118.4 1,704.5 1,376.1 
Relative deal size 0.392 0.290 0.400 0.213 0.590 0.270 0.253 0.271 0.156 0.365 0.288 0.188 0.298 0.182 0.345 0.617 0.407 0.638 0.387 0.840 
Acq. MTBV 2.865 2.877 2.864 2.867 3.278 2.565 2.947 2.544 2.868 2.093 2.836 2.838 2.836 2.874 3.278 3.229 2.875 3.265 2.852 3.927 
Acq. age (in years) 11.5 11.0 11.6 13.8 9.5 16.4 17.0 16.4 17.8 16.0 11.1 10.8 11.1 12.4 9.8 7.0 7.7 6.9 8.1 6.1 
Acq. cash ratio 0.180 0.257 0.174 0.162 0.210 0.099 0.176 0.095 0.111 0.070 0.166 0.242 0.159 0.175 0.148 0.292 0.326 0.288 0.254 0.333 
Acq. debt/equity ratio 0.833 0.478 0.863 0.898 0.765 1.137 0.585 1.168 1.062 1.438 0.866 0.522 0.899 0.873 0.853 0.440 0.363 0.448 0.565 0.316 
Earnout value ($m) 37.62 37.62 - - - 88.45 88.45 - - - 32.30 32.30 - - - 14.47 14.47 - - - 
Rel. earnout value 0.34 0.34 - - - 0.30 0.30 - - - 0.31 0.31 - - - 0.38 0.38 - - - 
 
Panel A refers to all M&As included in the analysis; Panel B refers to only M&As announced by low-sigma acquirers; Panel C refers to only M&As announced by medium-sigma acquirers; Panel D refers to only M&As announced by high-sigma acquirers. Each 
panel is organized as follows: it vertically presents the number of all deals, the number of deals that are earnout-based (Earnout), the number of deals that are not earnout-based (NEA), the number of deals fully settled in cash (Cash) and the number of 
deals fully settled in stock (Stock), which is further (horizontally) categorized by the target firm’s listing status (i.e. private, public and subsidiary), the target firm’s domicile (i.e. domestic and foreign) and the merging firms’ industry relatedness (i.e. focused 
and diversifying), as well as by the extent of intangible richness of the target firm’s assets (i.e. target in int. sector), followed by the mean of acquirer- and deal- specific characteristics (i.e. sigma, deal value, acquirer market value (Acq. MV), relative deal size, 
acquirer MTBV (Acq. MTBV), acquirer age (Acq. Age), acquirer cash ratio (Acq. Cash Ratio), and acquirer debt to equity ratio (Acq. Debt/Equity Ratio)). ‘All’ refers to all M&As within each Panel; ‘Private target’ corresponds to deals involving private targets; 
‘Public target’ corresponds to deals involving public targets; ‘Subsidiary target’ corresponds to deals involving subsidiary targets; ‘Domestic’ refers to deals where the acquirer’s and target’s domiciles coincide; ‘Foreign’ refers to cross-border acquisitions 
in which the acquirer and target are based in different countries; ‘Focused’ refers to deals in which acquirer and target operate in the same industry, i.e. they share the same two-digit SIC code; ‘Diversifying’ refers to diversifying deals in which acquirer and 
target operate in different industries, i.e. they do not share the same two-digit SIC code; ‘Target in int, sector’ corresponds to deals involving targets operating in intangible-rich sectors (consumer products and services, financials, healthcare, high-tech, 
media and entertainment, and telecommunications); ‘Sigma’ corresponds to the acquiring firm’s idiosyncratic stock return volatility (measured as in Moeller et al., 2007); ‘Deal value’ reflects the deal’s transaction value (in $mil.); ‘Acq. MV’ corresponds to 
the acquiring firm’s market capitalization (measured 20 days prior to the deal’s announcement); ‘Relative deal size’ corresponds to the relative size of the deal (=deal value/acquirer’s market value 20 days prior to the deal’s announcement); ‘Acq. MTBV’ 
corresponds to the acquiring firm’s market-to-book ratio (measured 20 days prior to the deal’s announcement); ‘Acq. age’ corresponds to the number of years between the acquirer’s first recorded day on Datastream and the deal’s announcement day; ‘Acq. 
cash ratio’ corresponds to the acquirer’s ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets at the end of the last quarter prior to the deal’s announcement; ‘Acq. debt/equity ratio’ corresponds to the acquirer’s ratio of total debt to common equity at the end 
of the last quarter prior to the deal’s announcement; ‘Earnout value’ refers to the value (in $mil) of the deferred payment in an earnout-based M&A; ‘Rel. earnout value’ corresponds to the relative earnout size of the deal (=earnout value/deal value). Further 





Table 3 Correlation matrix of main variables 
   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) 
Sigma (1) 
                         
Deal value (2) -0.06 
                        
Acq. MV (3) -0.11 0.25 
                       
Relative deal size (4) 0.27 0.07 -0.07 
                      
Acq. MTBV (5) 0.02 0.03 0.12 -0.11 
                     
Acq. cash ratio (6) 0.26 -0.04 -0.01 0.03 0.14 
                    
Acq. debt/equity ratio (7) -0.13 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.09 -0.20 
                   
Acq. age (8) -0.26 0.12 0.23 -0.09 -0.03 -0.22 0.04 
                  
Earnout value (9) -0.11 0.76 0.48 0.02 0.09 -0.03 0.09 0.15 
                 
Earnout  (10) 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.10 -0.05 -0.02 - 
                
Cash  (11) -0.18 -0.04 0.10 -0.14 0.00 -0.06 0.03 0.17 - -0.21 
               
Stock  (12) 0.18 0.02 -0.02 0.11 0.04 0.07 -0.02 -0.11 - -0.15 -0.40 
              
Mixed  (13) 0.01 0.04 -0.07 0.06 -0.04 -0.05 0.02 -0.07 - -0.21 -0.53 -0.39 
             
Private target (14) 0.16 -0.11 -0.08 -0.04 0.03 0.16 -0.09 -0.17 -0.04 0.14 -0.15 0.04 0.04 
            
Public target (15) -0.14 0.16 0.10 0.06 -0.01 -0.11 0.09 0.15 0.04 -0.15 -0.02 0.16 -0.05 -0.55 
           
Subsidiary target (16) -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.07 0.02 0.05 0.02 -0.02 0.19 -0.20 0.00 -0.59 -0.34 
          
Foreign  (17) 0.01 -0.01 0.08 -0.02 0.03 0.06 -0.02 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.11 -0.07 -0.06 -0.02 -0.04 0.07 
         
Diversifying  (18) 0.05 -0.03 0.04 0.04 -0.01 -0.04 0.01 0.02 -0.07 0.01 0.02 -0.06 0.02 0.05 -0.07 0.02 0.01 
        
Target in int. sector (19) 0.04 -0.01 0.05 -0.05 0.06 0.22 -0.04 -0.11 0.04 0.05 -0.06 0.14 -0.10 0.09 0.04 -0.14 -0.06 -0.09 
       
Target in med. & ent. (20) 0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.04 0.00 -0.03 0.02 -0.05 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.06 -0.02 0.03 0.16 
      
Target in retail (21) 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.03 0.13 -0.05 
     
Target in financials (22) -0.13 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.09 -0.21 0.17 0.04 0.05 -0.07 -0.09 0.17 -0.03 -0.05 0.18 -0.12 -0.11 -0.11 0.28 -0.10 -0.08 
    
Target in high-tech (23) 0.10 -0.03 0.06 -0.06 0.10 0.33 -0.13 -0.08 -0.07 0.05 0.01 0.06 -0.09 0.11 -0.06 -0.07 0.05 -0.06 0.34 -0.13 -0.10 -0.22 
   
Target in healthcare (24) 0.00 0.03 0.04 -0.01 0.03 0.10 -0.05 0.02 0.17 0.08 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.08 0.23 -0.09 -0.07 -0.15 -0.18 
  
Target in cons. & serv. (25) 0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.07 0.04 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.07 -0.06 -0.02 0.01 0.12 0.21 -0.08 -0.06 -0.13 -0.16 -0.11 
 
 
This table reports the Pearson correlation coefficients between the following variables: ‘Sigma’ corresponds to the acquiring firm’s idiosyncratic stock return volatility (measured as in Moeller et al., 2007); ‘Deal value’ 
reflects the deal’s transaction value (in $mil.); ‘Acq. MV’ corresponds to the acquiring firm’s market capitalization (measured 20 days prior to the deal’s announcement); ‘Relative deal size’ corresponds to the relative size 
of the deal (=deal value/acquirer’s market value 20 days prior to the deal’s announcement); ‘Acq. MTBV’ corresponds to the acquiring firm’s market-to-book ratio (measured 20 days prior to the deal’s announcement); 
‘Acq. cash ratio’ corresponds to the acquirer’s ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets at the end of the last quarter prior to the deal’s announcement; ‘Acq. debt/equity ratio’ corresponds to the acquirer’s ratio 
of total debt to common equity at the end of the last quarter prior to the deal’s announcement; ‘Acq. Age’ corresponds to the number of years between the acquirer’s first recorded day on Datastream and the deal’s 
announcement day; ‘Earnout value’ refers to the value (in $m) of the deferred payment in an earnout-based M&A; ‘Earnout’ corresponds to earnout-based M&As; ‘Cash’ refers to M&As fully settled in cash; ‘Stock’ refers 
to M&As fully settled in stock; ‘Mixed’ refers to M&As encompassing combinations of cash, stock and other payments; ‘Private target’ corresponds to deals involving private targets; ‘Public target’ corresponds to deals 
involving public targets; ‘Subsidiary target’ corresponds to deals involving subsidiary targets; ‘Foreign’ refers to cross-border acquisitions in which the acquirer and target are based in different countries; ‘Diversifying’ 
refers to diversifying deals in which acquirer and target operate in different industries, i.e. they do not share the same two-digit SIC code; ‘Target in int. sector’ corresponds to deals involving targets operating in intangible-
rich sectors (consumer products and services, financials, healthcare, high-tech, media and entertainment, and telecommunications); ‘Target in med. & ent.’ refers to deals where the target operates within the media and 
entertainment two-digit SIC code; ‘Target in retail’ refers to deals where the target operates in the retail two-digit SIC code; ‘Target in financials’ refers to deals where the target operates in the financials two-digit SIC 
code; ‘Target in high-tech’ refers to deals where the target operates in the high-tech two-digit SIC code; ‘Target in healthcare’ refers to deals where the target operates in the healthcare two-digit SIC code; ‘Target in cons. 
& serv.’ refers to deals where the target operates in the consumer products and services two-digit SIC code. Further information on the definition of each variable can be found in Appendix A. 
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Table 4 Univariate analysis of acquirer risk-adjusted returns 
 








(5) (1) – (2) (1) – (3) (1) – (4) (1) – (5) 
Panel A: All deals 
All Mean 1.26*** 1.68*** 1.23*** 0.99*** 1.26*** 1.45*** 0.45** 0.69*** 0.42* 0.23 N 35,121 2,638 32,483 12,387 8,011 12,085     
Private target Mean 1.85*** 1.32*** 1.91*** 0.90*** 3.01*** 1.95*** -0.59** 0.42** -1.68*** -0.63** N 17,148 1,947 15,201 4,786 4,214 6,201     
Public target Mean -0.77*** 2.44 -0.79*** 0.48*** -1.82*** -1.03*** 3.23* 1.95** 4.26** 3.47*** N 8,524 57 8,467 2,888 2,973 2,606     
Subsidiary target Mean 2.03*** 2.71*** 1.98*** 1.38*** 3.41*** 2.48*** 0.73* 1.33*** -0.70 0.23 N 9,449 634 8,815 4,713 824 3,278     
Panel B: Deals Announced by Low-Sigma Acquirers 
All Mean 0.23*** 1.20*** 0.18*** 0.36*** -0.35** 0.20** 1.02*** 0.84*** 1.55*** 1.00*** N 11,707 586 11,121 5,278 1,899 3,944       
Private target Mean 0.64*** 1.32*** 0.57*** 0.30*** 1.18*** 0.60*** 0.75*** 1.02*** 0.14 0.72** N 4,488 400 4,088 1,765 681 1,642       
Public target Mean -0.68*** 0.37 -0.68*** 0.09 -1.35*** -1.04*** 1.05* 0.28 1.72*** 1.41** N 3,824 18 3,806 1,515 1,093 1,198       
Subsidiary target Mean 0.71*** 1.00** 0.70*** 0.61*** 0.07 0.94*** 0.30 0.39 0.93 0.06 N 3,395 168 3,227 1,998 125 1,104         
Panel C: Deals Announced by Medium-Sigma Acquirers 
All Mean 0.75*** 1.10*** 0.72*** 0.93*** 0.01 0.88*** 0.37 0.17 1.09*** 0.22 N 11,707 994 10,713 4,579 2,216 3,918     
Private target Mean 1.06*** 0.87*** 1.09*** 0.68*** 1.42*** 1.30*** -0.22 0.19 -0.55 -0.43 N 5,600 739 4,861 1,880 1,062 1,919     
Public target Mean -0.88*** -2.80 -0.86*** 0.65*** -1.87*** -1.39*** -1.94 -3.45** -0.93 -1.41 N 2,888 17 2,871 967 958 946     
Subsidiary target Mean 1.69*** 2.08*** 1.66*** 1.36*** 1.57*** 2.16*** 0.42 0.72* 0.51 -0.08 N 3,219 238 2,981 1,732 196 1,053     
Panel D: Deals Announced by High-Sigma Acquirers 
All Mean 2.80*** 2.49*** 2.83*** 2.40*** 2.75*** 3.16*** -0.33 0.09 -0.26 -0.66 N 11,707 1,058 10,649 2,530 3,896 4,223       
Private target Mean 3.24*** 1.74*** 3.44*** 2.18*** 4.19*** 3.27*** -1.70*** -0.44 -2.46*** -1.54*** N 7,060 808 6,252 1,141 2,471 2,640       
Public target Mean -0.80** 8.18* -0.91*** 1.59*** -2.32*** -0.28 9.09*** 6.59** 10.51** 8.46*** N 1,812 22 1,790 406 922 462       
Subsidiary target Mean 3.99*** 4.63*** 3.93*** 3.00*** 4.95*** 4.29*** 0.70 1.63* -0.32 0.34 N 2,835 228 2,607 983 503 1,121     
Panel E: Differentials between Panel D and Panel B 
All target Mean 2.57*** 1.29*** 2.65*** 2.05*** 3.10*** 2.96***     
Private target Mean 2.61*** 0.42 2.87*** 1.88*** 3.01*** 2.67***     
Public target Mean -0.12 7.81* -0.23 1.51*** -0.97** 0.77*     
Subsidiary target Mean 3.27*** 3.63*** 3.23*** 2.39*** 4.89*** 3.36***     
 
The table presents mean announcement period five-day (𝑡𝑡 − 2, 𝑡𝑡 + 2) cumulative risk-adjusted returns for all acquisitions (Panel A) divided by target listing 
status (All, Private target, Public target and Subsidiary target) and method of payment (All, earnout, non-earnout (NEA), Cash, Stock and Mixed). The analysis 
is further categorized by low (Panel B), medium (Panel C) and high (Panel D) acquirer sigma deals. Panel E illustrates differences in mean risk-adjusted returns 
between high and low acquirer sigma deals. ‘All’ corresponds to the full number of deals in each panel; ‘Earnout’ corresponds to earnout-based M&As; ‘NEA’ 
corresponds to non-earnout-settled M&As in cash, stock or mixed; ‘Cash’ refers to M&As fully settled in cash; ‘Stock’ refers to M&As fully settled in stock; 
‘Mixed’ refers to M&As encompassing combinations of cash, stock and other payments; ‘Private target’ corresponds to deals involving private targets; ‘Public 
target’ corresponds to deals involving public targets; ‘Subsidiary target’ corresponds to deals involving subsidiary targets; ‘Low sigma’ corresponds to the 
bottom third of deals exhibiting the lowest levels of sigma; ‘Medium sigma’ corresponds to the middle third of deals in terms of their acquirer sigma ranking; 
‘High sigma’ corresponds to the top third of deals exhibiting the highest levels of sigma. The statistical significance of differences in returns between groups of 
acquirers is tested using the 𝑡𝑡-test for equality of means. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively of the mean for each covariate 




Table 5 Determinants of acquirer risk-adjusted returns: Multivariate analysis 
 
 Model:  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
Earnout  -0.008 -0.279 -0.678** -0.091 -0.644** -0.018 -0.592** -0.143 -0.536** -0.154 -0.481** -0.481** 
Unlisted   1.056***  2.380***  2.996***  2.919***  2.995***  2.921***  2.998***  2.922***  3.002***  2.917***  3.002***  2.929*** 
Target in int. sector -0.497*** -0.585*** -0.201* -0.251** -0.200* -0.252** -0.207* -0.231** -0.197* -0.248** -0.196* -0.249** 
Diversifying   0.241**  0.073  0.223**  0.194*  0.223**  0.194*  0.223**  0.194*  0.215**  0.247**  0.222**  0.195* 
Foreign   0.391** -0.072  0.383**  0.350**  0.384**  0.350**  0.385**  0.352**  0.387**  0.344**  0.396**  0.331** 
Sigma  26.975***            
Low sigma  -0.498*** -0.686***  -0.678***  -0.664***  -0.649***  -0.635***  
High sigma   1.779***   1.478***   1.497***   1.462***   1.465***   1.380*** 
Earnout × Low sigma    0.751**          
Earnout × High sigma    -0.959**         
Earnout × Low sigma × Unlisted      0.631*        
Earnout × High sigma × Unlisted      -1.186**       
Earnout × Low sigma × Target in int. sector        0.522      
Earnout × High sigma × Target in int. sector        -1.005**     
Earnout × Low sigma × Diversifying          0.373    
Earnout × High sigma × Diversifying          -1.838**   
Earnout × Low sigma × Foreign           -0.288  
Earnout × High sigma × Foreign             0.717 
Relative deal size  0.564***  0.009**  0.745***  0.701***  0.744***  0.701***  0.745***  0.702***  0.744***  0.702***  0.745***  0.701*** 
Acq. age  0.031  0.001  0.065  0.121**  0.065  0.122**  0.065  0.121**  0.066  0.119**  0.065  0.118** 
Acq. MTBV -0.074*** -0.103*** -0.062*** -0.065*** -0.062*** -0.065*** -0.062*** -0.065*** -0.062*** -0.065*** -0.062*** -0.065*** 
Acq. cash ratio -0.757** -1.226*** -0.371 -0.834** -0.372 -0.839** -0.370 -0.826** -0.372 -0.857** -0.373 -0.823** 
Acq. debt/equity ratio -0.040 -0.013 -0.043 -0.030 -0.043 -0.030 -0.043 -0.031 -0.043 -0.031 -0.044 -0.032 
Intercept  0.731 -0.761  0.342 -0.657  0.340 -0.665  0.338 -0.663  0.319 -0.650  0.313 -0.624 
Time fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Target industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R-squared (in %)  3.28  2.88  4.01  4.30  4.01  4.31  4.01  4.30  4.01  4.32  4.01  4.28 
F-stat  76.94***  62.42***  88.13***  94.62***  88.07***  94.83***  88.01***  94.63***  87.96***  95.08***  87.94***  94.28*** 
Min VIF  1.02  1.00  1.03  1.02  1.03  1.02  1.03  1.02  1.04  1.05  1.03  1.03 
Max VIF  1.26  1.42  1.38  1.69  1.36  1.66  1.28  1.50  1.26  1.30  1.26  1.29 
Mean VIF  1.12  1.14  1.17  1.23  1.17  1.23  1.16  1.20  1.14  1.16  1.13  1.13 
N  29,523  29,523  29,523  29,523  29,523  29,523  29,523  29,523  29,523  29,523  29,523  29,523 
 
The table presents results from the multivariate analysis examining the wealth effects of earnout-based deals. The dependent variable consists of the announcement period market-adjusted 
five-day (𝑡𝑡 − 2, 𝑡𝑡 + 2) risk-adjusted returns of acquirers, which are regressed against a set of explanatory variables. Regression outputs are estimated using ordinary least squares with the 
coefficients adjusted for possible heteroscedasticity using White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance. The intercept measures the risk-adjusted returns to 
acquirers after accounting for the effects of the explanatory variables included in the specification or model. ‘Earnout’ corresponds to earnout-based deals; ‘Unlisted’ corresponds to deals 
involving unlisted (private or subsidiary) targets; ‘Target in int. sector’ corresponds to deals involving targets operating in intangible-rich sectors (consumer products and services, financials, 
healthcare, high-tech, media and entertainment, and telecommunications); ‘Diversifying’ corresponds to diversifying deals (the acquiring and target firms do not share the same two-digit SIC 
number); ‘Foreign’ corresponds to cross-border deals; ‘Sigma’ corresponds to the acquiring firm’s idiosyncratic stock return volatility (measured as in Moeller et al., 2007); ‘Low sigma’ 
corresponds to the bottom third of deals exhibiting the lowest levels of sigma; ‘High sigma’ corresponds to the top third of deals exhibiting the highest levels of sigma; ‘Relative deal size’ 
corresponds to the relative size of the deal (=deal value/acquirer’s market value 20 days prior to the deal’s announcement); ‘Acq. age’ corresponds to the number of days between the acquirer’s 
first recorded day on Datastream and the deal’s announcement day; ‘Acq. MTBV’ corresponds to the acquiring firm’s market-to-book ratio (measured 20 days prior to the deal’s announcement); 
‘Acq. cash ratio’ corresponds to the acquirer’s ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets at the end of the last quarter prior to the deal’s announcement; ‘Acq. debt/equity ratio’ corresponds 
to the acquirer’s ratio of total debt to common equity at the end of the last quarter prior to the deal’s announcement. 𝑁𝑁 stands for the number of observations. ***, ** and * indicate significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. VIF is the Variance Inflation Factor, which quantifies the severity of multicollinearity. Variance inflation is the reciprocal of tolerance. Further information on 
the definition of each variable can be found in Appendix A. 
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Table 6 Addressing selection bias 
 
Model/exercise:  (1)   (2)   (3)  









Panel A: Logistic Regression 
Private target    1.151***    1.297***    1.948***  
Target in int. sector    0.187***    0.172***    0.220***  
Diversifying  -0.003   -0.087    0.033  
Foreign    0.241***    0.390***    0.119  
Sigma  -0.680    82.797***   -1.192*  
Relative deal size   0.097***    0.079***    0.515**  
Acq. age   0.018    0.040    0.050  
Acq. MTBV  -0.045*    0.200***   -0.075**  
Acq. cash ratio   0.964***        
Acq. debt/equity ratio   0.001        
Target in high-tech    0.213**        
Target in cons. & serv.    0.455***        
Target in telecoms    0.049        
Target under Common law   0.182        
Intercept  -4.751***   -6.375***   -4.646***  
Year fixed effects (YFE)   Yes    Yes    Yes  
Pseudo R-Squared (in %)   7.98    9.07    4.86  
LR chi square test   1,235.95    384.16    246.35  
Mean VIF   1.19    1.11    1.07  
N   28,371    10,256    7,964  






















Private target   1,519***  1,464***   353  338   549  518  
Target in int. sector   617  570   170  160   437  410  
Diversifying  905  887   233  233   301  306  
Foreign   349  300   106  119   116  106  
Sigma  0.036***  0.034***  0.002  0.014***  0.014*** -0.000  0.063***  0.062***  0.001 
Relative deal size -2.530*** -2.604***  0.075 -3.037*** -3.158***  0.120 -2.069*** -2.021*** -0.047 
Acq. age  7.872***  7.914*** -0.042  8.391***  8.440*** -0.050  7.498***  7.447***  0.051 
Acq. MTBV  0.865***  0.838***  0.027  0.881***  0.890*** -0.009  0.900***  0.867***  0.033 
Acq. cash ratio  0.252***  0.241***  0.012       
Acq. debt/equity ratio  0.530***  0.701*** -0.171       
Target in high-tech   602  553        
Target in cons. & serv.   260  264        
Target in telecoms   75  83        
Target under Common law  1,951  1,881        
Panel C: Differentials Treated vs. Control (Counterfactual) M&A Deals 
Mean CAR Treated (in %)   1.31***    1.18***    1.80***  
N   2,094    523    726  
Mean CAR Control (in %)   0.93***    0.32***    2.70***  
N   2,094    523    726  
Mean (in %) Difference (Treated VS Control)   0.38    0.85***   -0.90  
Panel D: Rosenbaum bounds 
RB: p-value of estimated difference at Γ=1   0.015    0.006    0.047  
RB: critical value of Γ at cut-off p=0.05   1.03    1.09    1.01  




Continued (Table 6) 
 
Panel A presents the output of the logistic regression models that were used to estimate the probability of occurrence of an earnout relative to alternative 
single up-front payment delivery methods. Panel B presents the balance of covariates between treated and control deals in the matching sequences. The 
PSM technique employs 1-to-1 nearest neighbour matching allowing for replacement. Differences in average covariates are tested using the t-test. Panel 
C presents mean five-day announcement period cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for treated and matched deals. The statistical significance of 
differences in mean returns between the two groups is tested using the t-test for equality of means. Panel D presents the outcome of the Rosenbaum 
bounds test. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively of the mean for each covariate presented. ‘Private target’ corresponds to 
deals involving private targets; ‘Target in int. sector’ corresponds to deals involving targets operating in intangible-rich sectors (consumer products and 
services, financials, healthcare, high-tech, media and entertainment, and telecommunications); ‘Diversifying’ corresponds to diversifying deals (the 
acquiring and target firms do not share the same two-digit SIC number); ‘Foreign’ corresponds to international deals; ‘Sigma’ corresponds to the acquiring 
firm’s idiosyncratic stock return volatility (measured as in Moeller et al., 2007); ‘Relative deal size’ corresponds to the relative size of the deal (=deal 
value/acquirer’s market value 20 days prior to the deal’s announcement); ‘Acq. Age’ corresponds to the number of days between the acquirer’s first 
recorded day on Datastream and the deal’s announcement day; ‘Acq. MTBV’ corresponds to the acquiring firm’s market-to-book ratio (measured 20 days 
prior to the deal’s announcement); ‘Acq. cash ratio’ corresponds to the acquirer’s cash ratio at the end of the last quarter prior to the deal’s announcement; 
‘Acq. debt/equity ratio’ corresponds to the acquirer’s ratio of total debt to common equity at the end of the last quarter prior to the deal’s announcement; 
‘Target in high-tech’ corresponds to deals involving targets operating in the high-tech sector; ‘Target in cons. & serv.’ corresponds to deals involving 
targets operating in the consumer products and services sector; ‘Target in telecoms’ corresponds to deals involving targets operating in the 
telecommunications sector; ‘Target under Common law’ corresponds to deals in which the target operates in a country under a Common law legal 
framework. ‘Low sigma’ corresponds to the bottom third of deals exhibiting the lowest levels of sigma; ‘High sigma’ corresponds to the top third of deals 
exhibiting the highest levels of sigma; 𝑁𝑁 stands for the number of observations. CAR corresponds to the five-day (𝑡𝑡 − 2, 𝑡𝑡 + 2) announcement period 
acquirer cumulative risk-adjusted returns; VIF is the Variance Inflation Factor, which quantifies the severity of multicollinearity. Variance inflation is the 





















Unlisted   0.015**  0.013***  0.013***  0.029*  0.052***  0.055*** 
Target in int. sector -0.010** -0.004* -0.003* -0.012 -0.014*** -0.012*** 
Diversifying -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.009  0.001  0.005 
Foreign  -0.007* -0.001  0.001  0.011  0.002  0.005 
Relative deal size  0.004***  0.004***  0.004***  0.020***  0.015***  0.014** 
Acq. age  0.002  0.002*  0.001*  0.001  0.001  0.001 
Acq. MTBV  0.001  0.001  0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001** 
Acq. cash ratio  0.023*  0.016*  0.018** -0.018 -0.020** -0.009 
Acq. debt/equity ratio -0.001 -0.001  0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
Control dummy: Low sigma  -0.006* -0.005* -0.004*      
Control dummy: High sigma    0.011  0.013**  0.013*** 
Intercept  0.004 -0.004 -0.001  0.058*  0.003 -0.009 
Time fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Target industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R-squared (in %)  4.74  3.04  2.69  6.13  5.18  5.06 
F-stat  4.22***  6.99***  9.31***  7.62***  15.6***  22.02*** 
Min VIF  1.04  1.06  1.06  1.01  1.01  1.01 
Max VIF  1.20  1.20  1.21  1.20  1.19  1.19 
Mean VIF  1.12  1.12  1.12  1.08  1.07  1.07 
N  1,032  2,687  4,056  1,414  3,441  4,973 
 
The table presents results from our multivariate analysis examining the wealth effects of earnout-based deals on the 
matched sample (created as discussed in Sections 3.2. and 5.3.). The dependent variable consists of the announcement 
period market-adjusted five-day (𝑡𝑡 − 2, 𝑡𝑡 + 2) risk-adjusted returns of acquirers which are regressed against a set of 
explanatory variables. Regression outputs are estimated using ordinary least squares with the coefficients adjusted for 
possible heteroscedasticity using White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance. The 
intercept measures the risk-adjusted returns to acquirers after accounting for the effects of the explanatory variables 
included in each specification. ‘Unlisted’ corresponds to deals involving unlisted (private or subsidiary) targets; ‘Target in 
int. sector’ corresponds to deals involving targets operating in intangible-rich sectors (consumer products and services, 
financials, healthcare, high-tech, media and entertainment, and telecommunications); ‘Diversifying’ corresponds to 
diversifying deals (the acquiring and target firms do not share the same two-digit SIC number); ‘Foreign’ corresponds to 
international deals; ‘Relative deal size’ corresponds to the relative size of the deal (=deal value/acquirer’s market value 20 
days prior to the deal’s announcement); ‘Acq. Age’ corresponds to the number of days between the acquirer’s first recorded 
day on Datastream and the deal’s announcement day; ‘Acq. MTBV’ corresponds to the acquiring firm’s market-to-book ratio 
(measured 20 days prior to the deal’s announcement); ‘Acq. cash ratio’ corresponds to the acquirer’ s ratio of cash and cash 
equivalents to total assets at the end of the last quarter prior to the deal’s announcement; ‘Acq. debt/equity ratio’ 
corresponds to the acquirer’s ratio of total debt to common equity at the end of the last quarter prior to the deal’s 
announcement; ‘Control dummy: Low sigma’ corresponds to deals that were control counterfactuals in PSM Exercise 2 (see 
Sections 3.2. and 5.3. for information on the formulation of the matching sequence); ‘Control dummy: High sigma’ 
corresponds to deals that were control counterfactuals in PSM Exercise 3 (see Sections 3.2. and 5.3. for information on the 
formulation of the matching sequence); 𝑁𝑁 stands for the number of observations. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 
5% and 10% respectively. VIF is the Variance Inflation Factor, which quantifies the severity of multicollinearity. Variance 
inflation is the reciprocal of tolerance. Further information on the definition of each variable can be found in Appendix A.  
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Table 8 Acquirer size, acquirer sigma, and acquirer risk-adjusted returns 
 
 N Acquirer MV CAR WCAR 
Panel A: All M&As 
All 35,121 5,611 1.26 -0.63 
Earnout 2,638 4,175 1.68 -0.16 
Non-earnout 32,483 5,728 1.23 -0.66 
Panel B: M&As Announced by Low-Sigma Acquirers 
All 11,707 11,274 0.23 -0.42 
Earnout 586 13,718 1.20 0.14 
Non-earnout 11,121 11,145 0.18 -0.46 
Panel C: M&As Announced by Medium-Sigma Acquirers 
All 11,707 4,488 0.75 -0.57 
Earnout 994 2,336 1.10 0.04 
Non-earnout 10,713 4,687 0.72 -0.6 
Panel D: M&As Announced by High-Sigma Acquirers 
All 11,707 1,073 2.80 -3.13 
Earnout 1,058 617 2.49 -4.52 
Non-earnout 10,649 1,118 2.83 -3.05 
 
The table presents M&A activity for all deals (All) (Panel A), earnout-based deals (earnout), as well as non-
earnout-settled deals (Non-earnout), according to the acquiring firm’s idiosyncratic stock return volatility 
(high, medium and low acquirer sigma in Panels B, C and D, respectively). 𝑁𝑁 stands for the number of 
observations; sigma corresponds to the acquiring firm’s idiosyncratic stock return volatility (measured as in 
Moeller et al., 2007); Low sigma corresponds to the bottom third of deals exhibiting the lowest levels of sigma; 
Medium sigma corresponds to the medium third of deals exhibiting medium levels of sigma; High sigma 
corresponds to the top third of deals exhibiting the highest levels of sigma; MV corresponds to each group’s 
average market capitalization of acquiring firms measured 20 days before the announcement of the deal; CAR 
corresponds to each group’s average CAR for the window from 𝑡𝑡 − 2 to 𝑡𝑡 + 2, where 𝑡𝑡 = 0 is the announcement 
day of the M&A; WCAR reports the weighted by MV average CAR of each group of deals as in Moeller et al. 












The figure presents the relative earnout value (= ratio of earnout value to the value of all M&As) by year, as well 
as the relative earnout activity (= ratio of earnout activity to all M&A activities by year) by year. The right-hand 
scale (corresponding to blue columns) reports the relative earnout value from 1985 to 2016 (inclusive) while 
the left-hand scale (corresponding to the red-continuous line) reports the frequency of earnout activity from 
1985 to 2016 (inclusive). The figure is restricted to the years including earnout-based M&As in our sample 
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